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1 Executive Summary 
 
2009 has not been marked by important legislative changes in the French pension system. The 
main measure legislated in the largest statutory scheme – the régime general – has been a 
reform of the pension bonuses offered to compensate women for maternity. However, the 
political debate around pension reform has continued to be very lively and a negotiation about 
a reform of statutory pension schemes is set to take place as from April 2010 and could lead 
to legislative changes in autumn 2010. The political debate has revolved around two main 
issues. On the one hand, policy-makers have discussed the possibility to replace all existing 
pay-as-you-go schemes by a single notional defined-contribution (NDC) system. However, 
the NDC issue lost momentum after it became clear that the current government is not 
interested in such radical overhaul of the pension system under the current legislature. In 
order to be politically viable, a switch to NDC would require a further harmonisation in the 
rules governing different schemes. The second major issue which has been at the centre of the 
political agenda has been the Government’s plan to introduce parametric changes in order to 
curb future deficits in statutory schemes and to promote longer working lives. The 
Government is considering either to increase the statutory retirement age and/or to increase 
the length of contribution required to get a full pension. The need to take into account the link 
between workers’ status in the labour market and their pension entitlements continues to be 
absent from the political debate, while it is clear that younger cohorts will have difficulties to 
have full contributory records due to structural changes in the labour market. 
The law entitled Hôpital, patients, santé, territoires (Hospital, patients, health and territories - 
HPST), presented by the Government at the end of 2008 was finally adopted in July 2009. It 
is a continuation of the decentralisation and regionalisation trend observed over the past years, 
as well as managerialisation of hospital trends. As shown with the strong debate and lobbying 
around this law, the main critique to be made on the recent French reforms of the health care 
sector is the ongoing absence of capacity of the State to regulate the sector against the will of 
the medical profession. Of special importance is the incapacity to improve equal access to 
health care in the French system. Inequalities in Health is one of the major drawbacks of the 
French health care system, but it does not seem to be preoccupying so much the Government 
since no serious attempt to overcome these have been implemented, and all the little efforts 
planned within the HPST law have been withdrawn under the pressure of the medical 
profession.  
Due to the postponement of the long-term care reform, debates in the past year have 
continued to revolve around the creation of this new social insurance branch for the 
dependency risk 
The Government estimates the loss in revenues for social security in 2009 and 2010 due to the 
economic crisis at EUR 21 billion. The “crisis deficit” represents approximately 65% of the 
deficit in 2009 and 75% of the deficit in 2010. So far, social protection schemes have 
officially considered as an automatic stabiliser during the economic crisis. The Government 
has decided: first, not to increase contribution rates or taxes used to finance social security 
(particularly the General Social Contribution – CSG – Contribution Sociale Généralisée 
which is also levied on capital income); second, not to finance social security’s deficits via the 
budget; and, finally, it says that it does not intend to make significant cuts in social protection 
schemes. 
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2 Current Status, Reforms as well as the Political and 
Scientific Discourse during the previous Year 
2.1 Pensions 
2.1.1 Overview of the system’s characteristics and reforms 
The French pension system is characterised by a very high degree of occupational 
fragmentation. 
The scheme that covers the largest population is the general private-sector pension scheme 
(the so-called régime général), which covers all wage-earners of the private sector (around 
60% of the workforce). This first pillar provides basic defined-benefit pensions which are 
financed by social security contributions calculated as a percentage of gross wage (14,95% up 
to a certain ceiling and 1,7% without a ceiling in 2010)1. Benefits are calculated on the basis 
of the annual average wage of the 25 years of highest pay, of the duration of insurance as well 
as of a replacement rate which is itself dependent on the duration of insurance and on the age 
of the insured person (with a maximum rate of 50%). The minimum retirement age in the 
régime général is set at 60. However, since the 2003 Fillon reform, workers who have started 
to work before age 16 or age 17 and who have a long contribution record (42 years)2 have the 
possibility to retire at age 58 and draw a full pension from the régime général.3 While the 
duration of insurance required to get a full benefit was set at 40 years in 2008 (or 160 
trimesters), the Government has decided – as part of the “rendez-vous 2008” planned by the 
2003 Fillon reform4 – to increase this duration each year by one trimester between 2009 and 
2012 (See table 1). 
Table 1: Duration of insurance required to get full pension 
 
Year Trimesters 
2009 161 
2010 162 
2011 163 
2012 164 
 
In addition to this statutory scheme, wage-earners of the private sector must also become 
registered with a mandatory supplementary pension scheme (régimes complémentaires 
obligatoires). Since the régimes complémentaires were established by collective agreements, 
social partners have an exclusive responsibility for their day-to-day management. Like the 
régime général, these schemes operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. Contributions are paid to 
independent pension institutions which have to comply with rules set by two federations 
managed by the social partners. The first federation, ARRCO5, regroups all the institutions 
which subsidise complementary retirement benefits for all employees. The second federation, 
AGIRC6, supervises pension institutions which finance supplementary pension benefits for 
managers (the “cadres”). Thus, managers get different benefits and have to pay different 
                                  
1
  http://www.urssaf.fr/employeurs/baremes/baremes/taux_des_cotisations_du_regime_general_01.html. 
2
  For a more detailed description of the scheme, see ALBERT, Christophe, « 2004 à 2006, trois ans de retraite 
anticipée au régime général », Retraite et Société, 54, juin 2008, pp. 160-182. 
3
  This scheme is called “retraite anticipée pour longue carrière”. 
4
  See PALIER, Bruno, NACZYK, Marek and MOREL, Nathalie, « Review of the National Strategy Report 
on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010. France », October 2008. 
5
  Association des Régimes de Retraites Complémentaires. 
6
  Association Générale des Institutions de Retraites des Cadres. 
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contribution rates from other wage-earners. The supplementary schemes are so-called “point 
schemes.” Participants in the schemes earn pension points based on their individual earnings 
as well as on a “price of the point”7 in return for the contributions they pay into the system. 
The pension points are filed in the records of the pension manager during the participant’s 
career and at retirement the supplementary pension benefit is calculated by multiplying the 
sum of the pension points by a “pension-point value”8. The value of the “price of the point” 
and the “pension-point value”, both of which determine the level of the pension received, is 
regularly modified by the social partners, after taking into account changes in the overall 
economic and demographic situation. Since the beginning of the nineties, the social partners 
have decided to reduce the purchasing power of ARRCO/AGIRC benefits, by bringing about 
changes in the indexation of the “price of the point” and of the “pension-point value”9. In 
1993, the social partners decided to index the “price of the point” to a much higher value than 
the wage inflation, while it had traditionally been indexed to that indicator. This means that 
the acquisition cost of ARRCO/AGIRC pension points is much higher for current workers 
than it was for previous cohorts. Moreover, the social partners decided to decrease the value 
of the point by indexing it to price inflation rather than to wage inflation. Between 2003 and 
2008, the price of the point was indexed again to the evolution of the average wage, but the 
pension point value continued to be indexed to price inflation. On 23 March 2009, the current 
agreement governing ARRCO and AGIRC10 has been prolonged until 31 December 2010. As 
a result of the agreement, the price of the point will continue to be indexed on wage inflation, 
while the value of the point will continue to be indexed on price inflation. Therefore, future 
pensioners will get a lower amount of benefits for the same amount of contribution paid. 
Retirement age in ARRCO and AGIRC also remains unchanged as a result of this agreement. 
Traditionally, the retirement age at ARRCO and AGIRC has been set at 65. However, given 
that the statutory retirement age (i.e. in the régime général) was set at 60 in 1982, social 
partners negotiated the possibility of drawing a full supplementary pension at age 60. Since 
the 2003 Fillon reform introduced early retirement at age 58 for workers with full contribution 
records, the social partners have negotiated the possibility for workers to receive an ARRCO 
or an AGIRC pension without a cut in the benefit level, from the moment when the full 
statutory pension is drawn. 
The principles regulating old-age pensions are different for other categories of workers. 
Farmers (3% of the workforce) and the self-employed (12%) also receive a defined-benefit 
basic pension, calculated on the basis of an annual average income (instead of an annual 
average wage). However, the first pillar in these schemes is much more heavily subsidised by 
the state budget than the régime général. Until recently, most of the self-employed did not 
draw pensions from a second pillar. The 2003 Fillon reform has altered this state of affairs: all 
                                  
7
  See next footnote. 
8
  The pension benefit P is equal to the number of pension points acquired during the working period 
multiplied by the “pension point value” PV. Pension points are calculated by multiplying the reference wage 
W by the contribution rate CR and by dividing these two elements by a “price of the point” PP whose value 
is changed regularly by AGIRC and ARRCO. The full pension is obtained at age 60, but benefits can be 
drawn from age 55 by applying a “reduction coefficient” RC, which depends on the retirement age and the 
total contribution period. The benefit formula can thus be represented as follows: 
 
( )
period)oncontributiRC(age,*PV*
PP
CR*W
P 





∑=  
9
  See WILLARD Jean-Charles, « Pilotage des régimes en points : le cas de l’AGIRC et de l’ARRCO », 
Retraite et Société, n°56, 2008-4, pp. 194-201 and D’YVOIRE Arnaud « Une technique au service des 
partenaires sociaux : l’exemple de l’AGIRC et de l’ARRCO », Lettre de l’Observatoire des retraites, n° 14, 
March 2005. 
10
  i.e. the 13 November 2003 agreement. See http://www.agirc-arrco.fr/documentation/textes-agirc-et-arrco/. 
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the self-employed (including farmers) now have to pay additional social security 
contributions in order to receive a supplementary defined-contribution pension in the future. 
The organisation of the pension system for public sector employees has traditionally differed 
considerably from private sector schemes, as generous retirement benefits have always been 
guaranteed by a single pillar. Each category of public sector employees (20% of the labour 
force) must join a specific pension plan. The degree of fragmentation along occupational lines 
is very high for these pension arrangements11. Although all pension arrangements have their 
own rules, they share significant characteristics. All of them are PAYG and offer defined-
benefit pensions. Benefits are calculated on the basis of the wage earned during the last six 
months of the worker’s career and the maximum replacement rate is fixed at 75%. Rights are 
acquired after a minimum contribution period of 15 years. While the length of insurance 
required to get full benefits is the same in civil servants’ pension schemes as in the régime 
général (i.e. 162 trimesters in 2010), it continued to be lower for members of so-called 
régimes spéciaux12 (154 trimesters in January 2010; 155 trimesters in July 201013).  
The specific architecture of the French pension system has not left much space for the 
development of fully-funded pension plans. As all statutory benefits are earnings-related, be 
they provided by a single pillar or by two different pillars, pensioners have been generally 
able to maintain their income status. The 2003 Fillon reform has tried to promote the creation 
of private pension arrangements, by introducing a legal framework which allows for the 
creation of individual savings plans which are intended exclusively for pension savings and 
are available to all individuals, particularly to wage-earners. Coverage by different funded 
pension schemes has been steadily growing in recent years14. According to the most recent 
available figures15, individual retirement plans (PERP) covered approximately 2.05 million 
people on 31 December 2008 (compared to 1.88 million in 2006 and 2 million in 2007), while 
enterprise-level or industry-level voluntary pension schemes (PERCO) covered 444,000 
people in 2008 (compared to 201,000 in 2006 and 334,000 people in 2007). Coverage by 
enterprise-level or industry-level mandatory defined-contribution (DC) pension schemes (art. 
83) also increased to approx. 3.5 million workers (while approximately 2.7 to 2.8 million 
workers were covered by such schemes in 2006 and 3 million people in 2007). 
Over the last few years, early retirement has become an important issue in French retirement 
policy16. Given its impact on the financing of the pension system, increasing labour market 
participation of the elderly has become a government priority. The 2009 bill on the financing 
of social security (Loi de financement de la Sécurité Sociale - PLFSS- pour 2009)17 included a 
                                  
11
  Civil servants and the military get benefits from the Régime des Agents de l’Etat, local government 
employees from the CNRACL, while people such as miners, rail workers, electricity and gas employees who 
are employed in state-owned firms or by the state are members of régimes spéciaux. Most of these schemes 
are managed directly by the responsible firm or organisation, while some of them are managed by an 
independent pension fund (CNRACL, miners, Opéra de Paris, Comédie Française, seamen, etc.). 
12
  i.e. special pension schemes covering people who are employed in state-owned firms or by the state – e.g. 
miners, rail workers, electricity and gas employees, Comédie Française, Opéra de Paris, etc. 
13
  As a result of the 2007 reform of the régimes spéciaux, the length of insurance will increase by two 
trimesters every year until December 2012 and by one trimester every year from July 2013. 
14
  For a presentation of these different schemes, see PALIER, Bruno, NACZYK, Marek and MOREL, 
Nathalie, « Review of the National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010. 
France », October 2008, pp. 8-10. 
15
  AUBERT Patrick, BARTHELEMY Nadine, CHRISTEL Virginie, DUCOUDRE Bruno, LABORDE 
Charline, « Les retraités et les retraites en 2008 », Etudes et Résultats, Drees, n° 722, April 2010.  
16
  For a presentation of the different pathways to early retirement, see PALIER, Bruno, NACZYK, Marek and 
MOREL, Nathalie, « Review of the National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
2008-2010. France », October 2008, pp. 5-8. 
17
  http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/plfss_2009.asp  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019942966. 
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number of measures aiming at promoting longer working lives: a) increase in the pension 
bonus rate – surcote – to 5%, b) lifting of restrictions to the accumulation of remunerated 
employment with pension for pensioners aged 65 or more as well as on pensioners aged 60 or 
more who draw a full pension); c) increase to 70 years (previously 65 years) in the age at 
which private-sector companies can send a worker to retirement without having to ask for his 
or her consent; d) in order to force companies to negotiate on older workers’ employment, 
introduction of a 1% contribution on the wage bills of companies that will not have reached 
an agreement by 2010. The 2010 bill on the financing of social security (Loi de financement 
de la Sécurité Sociale - PLFSS- pour 2010)18 confirmed the last measure and introduced the 
1% contribution for all companies employing more than 50 workers that did not reach an 
agreement by 31 December 2009. By May 2010, 163 companies employing more than 300 
workers which had not reached an agreement or which had not introduced an action plan on 
the issue had been forced to pay the penalty imposed by the state19 20. 
 
2.1.2 Overview of debate/political discourse 
Recent political debates on the evolution of the French pension system have centred around 
three main themes: the reform of pension bonuses offered to compensate women for 
maternity, the introduction of notional defined-contribution pensions and, finally, the 
introduction of parametric changes such as an increase in the statutory retirement age and an 
increase in the length of contribution required to get a full pension. A negotiation about a 
reform of statutory pension schemes is set to take place as from April 2010 and could lead to 
legislative changes in autumn 2010.  
The autumn 2009 has been marked by a reform of family-related benefits in the régime 
général. This reform followed debates about this issue which took place in 2007 and 2008 and 
which resulted in the publication of a report by the COR (Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites) 
in December 2008 (See Annual Report 2009). All French pension schemes have traditionally 
offered pension bonuses to pensioners who have had children. Until its reform in autumn 
2009, the régime général offered mothers a “length of insurance” bonus of up to two years 
per child (MDA - majoration de durée d’assurance). In the civil servants’ schemes, women 
get a one-year length of insurance bonus for children born before 2004 if they stopped 
working for at least two years at birth. Finally, almost all schemes offer 10% pension bonuses 
for people who have had at least three children21.  
However, bonuses offered to compensate women for periods of maternity have been recently 
called into question on the ground that they discriminate against men. The revelation by the 
media22 of the fact that the Highest Court (Court of Cassation) had decided in February 2009 
to grant the régime général’s length of insurance bonus (MDA) to a male worker triggered a 
debate about a reform of the scheme and ultimately resulted in its reform in autumn 2009. The 
Court of Cassation motivated its decision on the grounds that article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights stipulates that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex”. 
The Government initially hesitated whether to reform the scheme in 2009 or in 2010 (as part 
                                  
18
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/lfss/lfss2010/lfss2010.htm. 
19
  Les Echos, « Seniors. Cent soixante-trois entreprises de plus de 300... ». 19 May 2010. 
20
  A list of all branch-level agreements is available on: http://www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/emploi-des-
seniors,599/1242,1242/dossiers,1243/liste-actualisee-des-accords-de,8650.html. 
21
  For a general description, see http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/index.php?id=118. 
22
  La Tribune, 28 May 2009, “Les avantages familiaux sur la sellette”; Le Monde, 31 May 2009, “Retraite: les 
droits accordés aux mères menacés”. 
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of a larger pension reform package – see below), but it became clear in August 2009 that a 
reform of the MDA would be included in the 2010 bill on the financing of social security (Loi 
de Financement de la Securité Sociale 2010). After negotiations with the social partners, the 
Government decided to split the two year bonus into two different parts. The first part, which 
offers a one-year length of insurance bonus for every child, is exclusively reserved for 
women, because it is explicitly linked to delivery23. The second part, which also grants a 
length of insurance bonus of one year, is to be divided between people (mother and father) 
who have actively taken part in the education of a child during the four years that followed its 
birth. 
Keeping the link between the pension bonus for children and maternity (retained in the first 
part of the bonus) has been an explicit demand of part of the UMP24 rank-and-file, who 
emphasise the need to preserve family values25. Moreover, all main stakeholders in the 
pension system– i.e. trade unions, MEDEF (France’s main employers’ association) and the 
powerful UNAF (National Union of Family Associations) – have been in favour of 
maintaining an element in the pension system that will compensate women for the 
disadvantages they face in the labour market26. During the legislative process, questions were 
raised by trade unions about two key issues. The first issue was the possible conflicts the 
allocation of the pension bonus might generate between parents27. The solution that has been 
finally adopted stipulates that parents will have to decide about the allocation of the pension 
bonus in the six months following the 4th birthday of the child. In case of a conflict, the 
national old-age insurance institution (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse – CNAV) will 
allocate the bonus to the parent who proves to have taken part in the child’s education for the 
longest period of time. In case such a state of affairs is impossible to prove, the bonus will be 
divided equally between the two parents. The second problem unions raised during the 
legislative process had to do with whether the new length-of-insurance pension bonus would 
also be counted as part of the length-of-insurance requirements to get an early entitlement28. 
Although initially opposed to allowing this possibility, the Government finally conceded to 
the unions during the autumn29. 
The second major debate concerning the evolution of the pension system has revolved around 
plans to transform the current system into a notional-defined contribution (NDC) system. 
While the idea of replacing current pension schemes by a single NDC system had already 
been proposed in the past by right-wing politicians such as Alain Madelin or François Bayrou 
but also by Laurence Parisot, MEDEF’s president30, the issue gained momentum in 2008 after 
two French economists, Antoine Bozio and Thomas Piketty, who are generally considered to 
be close to left-wing political organisations, published on their own initiative a report in 
which they argue that the French pension system needs to be profoundly reformed31. In order 
to simplify a system they judged too complex, the authors proposed to replace all existing 
                                  
23
  See article L. 351-4 of the Social Security Code (Code de la Securite Sociale). 
24
  Right-wing political party, which currently commands a majority in the French Parliament and of which the 
French President is a member. 
25
  E.g. Les Echos, 14 August 2009, “Attention à ne pas démanteler la politique familiale”. 
26
  Les Echos, 03 September 2009, “Retraites des mères : les partenaires sociaux esquissent une solution”. Les 
Echos, 11 September 2009, “Retraites des mères : les positions se rapprochent”. 
27
  Les Echos, 09 October 2009, “Retraites des mères: les syndicats veulent encore des aménagements”. 
28
  Since 2003, workers who have started to work at age 16 or before and who have a full contribution record 
before the statutory retirement age, can retire at age 58. 
29
  Les Echos, 27 October 2009, “Retraites des mères: le gouvernement prêt a des concessions”. 
30
  BICHOT Jacques, “Retraites: et pourquoi pas un régime unifié par points ?”, Les Echos, 09 October 2007. 
31
  BOZIO Antoine and PIKETTY Thomas, « Pour un nouveau système de retraite. Des comptes individuels de 
cotisations financés par répartition », Paris, Editions Rue d’Ulm/Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, 
2008. 
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schemes by a single NDC scheme for all workers (public sector, private sector and non-wage-
earners). The upshot of the reform would be that the pension system would become much 
more transparent and that it would be better suited for a flexible labour market. The authors 
also emphasised the fact that such a system does not preclude redistribution, and that, on the 
contrary, it makes it more transparent and better targeted.  
The NDC issue has been high on the political agenda during the last two years, and the fact 
that the Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites (COR) has been asked by MPs of the current 
majority32 to assess the technical feasibility of the introduction of an NDC system has been a 
clear sign of it. After a series of meetings during which different notes were presented to the 
members of the COR33, the COR has published a final report in January 201034.Given the fact 
that the COR is a non-partisan body and that its role is to feed the pension debate with as 
reliable information and data as possible, the COR’s report cannot be considered as a 
blueprint for reform. The report includes some simulations realised by the National Old-Age 
Insurance Institution (CNAV and the National Institute of Statistics (INSEE which show that 
without an increase in the statutory retirement age (currently set at 60 years) replacement rates 
would drop for most workers. However, the report’s main conclusion is that a move is 
technically feasible, but it would involve difficult political choices concerning the overall 
architecture of the pension system, the objectives that it should achieve in priority (financial 
sustainability, intergenerational equity or redistribution) and the mode of transition from the 
old system to a new system. 
In fact, it has become clear over the last year that the current government is not interested in 
such radical overhaul of the pension system under the current legislature. The fact that a move 
to an NDC system is not a priority of the Government was first signalled in June 2009, when 
Nicolas Sarkozy announced his plan to reform the pension system in 2010 (by organising a 
“rendez-vous des retraites 2010”) and mentioned the statutory retirement age and the length 
of insurance as parameters that would be examined. Sarkozy did not mention a move to an 
NDC system as a possible option for reform35. This lack of mention was particularly 
significant because the COR was due to start debating about the NDC system on June 30th, i.e. 
one week after Sarkozy’s announcement36. The will to introduce an NDC system lost 
momentum during the year. A note presented by the general secretariat of the COR in 
December 2009 underlined the technical and legal complexity of the move. One of the main 
problems is how to take into account elements of solidarity that exist in current schemes (e.g. 
how to take into account periods of unemployment, sickness and maternity, all of which vary 
from one scheme to another). The note emphasised that taking into account these elements 
would require important changes in existing rules with the risk for the Government of 
incurring supplementary costs37. Officials working within the executive declared to the press 
that “apart from its complexity, such a reform will not solve the problem of the deficit”38. A 
move to NDC in the very near future was officially excluded by the Government in January 
2010, after Xavier Darcos, the Minister for Social Affairs, declared that such a reform would 
not solve the main issue the French pension system faces, i.e. the employment rate of elderly 
                                  
32
  Les Echos, “Retraites: des pistes de réforme face à un déficit qui explose”, 21 January 2009. 
33
  http://www.cor-retraites.fr/rubrique2.html. 
34
  http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article363.htm.  
35
  La Tribune, “Retraites : “2010 sera un rendez-vous capital, tout sera mis sur la table””, 23 June 2009. 
36
  Les Echos, “Le Conseil d’orientation lance le débat sur la retraite par points”, 30 June 2009. 
37
  http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article360.html. 
38
  Les Echos, “Retraites : le régime par points ne fait pas recette”, 16 December 2009. 
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workers39 and after François Fillon declared that such a systemic reform was “a utopia” and 
“the best way to do nothing”40. 
The third major debate which has been taking place in France during the past year concerns 
the introduction of parametric changes in the statutory schemes, in order to curb future 
deficits. In June 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the current right-wing government 
would seek to reform statutory pension schemes in 2010 and that three main parameters 
would be taken into account : the length of insurance needed to get a full pension, the 
statutory retirement age and the rules concerning “hard working conditions” (pénibilité du 
travail). However, the detailed measures that are going to be taken are to be negotiated 
between April 2010 and July 2010. A legislative text should be submitted to Parliament in 
September 201041. The official negotiation has been preceded by the publication of renewed 
projections by the COR on 14 April 2010. These projections, which take into account the 
impact of the crisis, show that the cumulated sum of annual borrowing requirements for the 
pension system will add up to between 77% and 118% of GDP by 2050.  
So far, there is no consensus among the different actors involved in pension policy about 
which measures could be taken. Since Sarkozy’s speech in June 2009, the signals sent by the 
Government concerning the concrete measures it is ready to take have been unclear. The 
official objective of the Government is to increase employment rates among the elderly42. The 
Government does not exclude an increase in the statutory retirement age (currently set at 60 
years), but it also mentions the possibility to increase the length of insurance required to get a 
full pension (which should reach 41 years in 2012). The Government is supported in these 
aims by MEDEF, France’s main employers’ association, which already pushed for an increase 
in the retirement age during the 2009 AGIRC-ARRCO negotiation (see Annual Report 2009). 
However, apart from the CFE-CGC trade union which represents managers and engineers (the 
cadres), all unions unequivocally oppose a rise in the retirement age. Unions argue that the 
Government cannot raise the retirement age or increase the length of insurance, if it does not 
offer the guarantee that elderly workers will be able to work longer in their current jobs or 
that they will be able to find new jobs, if they are unemployed. Consensus is also unlikely to 
emerge with the main opposition party, the Socialist Party (PS – Parti Socialiste) which is 
split on the issue whether the retirement age should be increased43.  
Two other issues are set to be raised during the 2010 negotiation : the introduction of possible 
retirement compensations for “hard working conditions” and the parameters that define the 
benefit formula in civil servants’ and public-sector workers’ schemes. In the last years, trade 
unions have been asking for the creation of early retirement schemes that would be financed 
by the companies employing workers in hard working conditions. The social partners 
conducted difficult negotiations on “hard working conditions” (pénibilité du travail) since 
2005, but these broke down in July 2008. The Government might use the issue to try to 
persuade unions to accept an increase in the retirement age. The Government has also 
announced it was considering changing parameters in the benefit formula of civil servants and 
public-sector workers. Currently, the pensions of these occupational categories are calculated 
on the basis of the wages they earned during last six months of their career (compared to the 
“best 25 years” in the private-sector scheme). Such a change is strongly opposed by public-
sector unions. 
                                  
39
  Les Echos, « Xavier Darcos écarte une reforme “systémique” », 27 January 2010. 
40
  Le Figaro, François Fillon : « Nous sommes déterminés à faire des efforts sans précédent », 30 January 
2010. 
41
  Le Monde, “Retraites : début d'une réforme à haut risque”, 13 April 2010. 
42
  Le Monde, “Retraites : le gouvernement privilégie l’allongement de la durée du travail”, 14 January 2010. 
43
  Les Echos, “Martine Aubry fait machine arrière sur l’âge légal”, 27 January 2010. 
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2.1.3 Impact assessment 
The debate concerning a reform of the French pension system has been used as an opportunity 
to ask the COR to produce new projections on the evolution of the mid-term and long-term 
financial situation of the pension system. These simulations have deliberately been trying to 
take into account the effects of the financial and economic crisis on the pension system. The 
report is based on the same demographic44 and the same legal assumptions as the November 
2007 projections45. This means that the COR projections do not take into account the effects 
of possible changes introduced in the pension system in 2010. However, the COR has 
changed its economic assumptions and has retained three different scenarios, which differ 
from each other on two variables, i.e. unemployment rates and productivity growth rates. In 
the “A” scenario, the long-term unemployment rate reaches 4,5% and productivity growth 
rate is set at 1,8%. In the “B” scenario, unemployment rates also reach 4,5%, but labour’s 
productivity growth rate is set at 1,5%. Finally, in the “C” scenario, the long-term 
unemployment rate is set at 7% and the trend for labour’s productivity growth is set at 1,5%. 
These three scenarios have been chosen “to illustrate the uncertainties that currently exist on 
the long-term perspectives of the economy after the crisis”46.  
The COR’s mid-term projections show that the borrowing needs of the French pension system 
(besoin du financement du système) will reach 1,7% of GDP in 2020 (“A” scenario), 1,9% 
(“B” scenario) or 2,1% (“C” scenario). This is a significant increase compared to COR’s 2007 
projections which predicted that the annual borrowing needs of the system would reach 1% of 
GDP in 2020. The largest part in the degradation of the financial situation of the French 
system is to occur in 2009 and 2010, because the estimated deficit of the French pension 
system is to reach 1,7% of GDP (EUR 32 billion) in 2010. According to COR, this situation is 
largely explained by a drop in employment rates, and as a result by the income perceived by 
pension schemes. 
The COR’s long-term projections now show that the borrowing needs will reach 1,7% of 
GDP in 2050 (i.e. EUR 72 billion) if the crisis has no long-term effects on growth and 
unemployment rates (“A” scenario). This results corresponds to the COR’s 2007 projections. 
However, if the crisis is assumed to have a long term effect on these two variables, the annual 
borrowing needs of the French pension system will reach either 2,7% of GDP in 2050 (i.e. 
EUR 103 billion - “B” scenario) or 3% (i.e. EUR 103 billion - “C” scenario). These results are 
based on the assumption that the “rate-of-return” in the AGIRC-ARRCO supplementary 
schemes (See section 2.1.4 for more information about the “rate-of-return” in these schemes) 
will remain constant. However, if the rate-of-return is assumed to decrease, the borrowing 
needs of the whole French pension system will be lower: 1% of GDP in the “A” scenario, 2% 
of GDP in the “B” scenario or 2,3% in the “C” scenario. However, a lower “rate-of-return” in 
these schemes also means lower benefit levels, which affects the adequacy of pensions. 
While the COR’s 2007 report also included projections about the evolution of replacement 
rates for standard private-sector workers (See Annual Report 2009), the 2010 report does not 
include new estimations of replacement rates. However, the report provides an indicator of 
the evolution of the relative purchasing power of old-age pensions compared to that of the 
average wages in the economy. According to COR, if one chooses the year 2008 as a 
                                  
44
  Demographic assumptions are based on INSEE’s (National Institute of Statistics) most recent demographic 
projections which date back to 2006. 
45
  CONSEIL D’ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, “Retraites : 20 fiches d’actualisation pour le rendez-vous 
de 2008”, Cinquième rapport, November 2007 (see: http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article321.html). 
46
  CONSEIL D’ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES, “Retraites: perspectives actualisées à moyen et long 
terme en vue du rendez-vous de 2010”, Huitième rapport, April 2010 (see: http://www.cor-
retraites.fr/article368.html). 
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reference point (base 100), the ratio between the average net pension and the average net 
wage will decline by 6% (“A” scenario), 4% (“B” scenario) and 3% (“C” scenario) in 2020. 
In the long run (year 2050), the purchasing power of pensions relative to wages might decline 
by 23% (“A” scenario), 16% (“B” scenario), 15% (“C” scenario), assuming that the AGIRC-
ARRCO “rate-of-return” will remain constant. If this rate-of-return diminishes, the ratio 
might even decline by 29% (“A” scenario), 21% (“B” scenario) or 20% (“C” scenario). These 
figures show that the purchasing power of pensions relative to wages is set to decline in the 
future. The figures also show the crucial influence of the AGIRC-ARRCO pensions on the 
income of pensioners. Changes in the rate-of-return in these schemes – which are determined 
by the indexation of pensions – may have a strong effect on the income of future pensioners. 
While labour market participation of the elderly has become one of the main issues French 
policy-makers have to deal with in order to improve the financial sustainability of the pension 
system, the impact of measures taken in 2009 and 2010 to promote longer working lives 
cannot be assessed at the moment. However, recent research has continued to evaluate the 
effects of the 2003 Fillon reform which included measures both aiming at the promotion of 
longer working lives (surcote – pension bonus for deferred retirement, cumul emploi-retraite, 
retraite progressive – progressive retirement) and an early retirement scheme for workers 
with long careers (retraite anticipée pour longue carrière). In 200847, a study had shown that 
the surcote (pension bonus for deferred retirement) had almost no impact on the behaviour of 
workers, since it had attracted only 5% of wage-earners in 2005, 6% in 2006 and 7,6% in 
2007, while, before the introduction of the surcote, 7% of the insured decided to work after 
they had already reached the required length of contribution required to get a full pension. 
The most recent data suggests that the surcote starts to attract more workers, since 9% of 
workers decided to retire with a surcote in 200848. However, it must also be noted that the 
proportion of workers retiring with a decrease in the level of the pension (décote), if the 
worker retires before having reached the statutory retirement age or the length of insurance 
required to get a full pension) has increased from 5% in 2005 to 6% in 200849. The high take-
up rate in the early retirement scheme for long careers (retraite anticipée pour longue 
carrière) also continues to have a negative impact on the age at which people decide to 
receive their pension from statutory schemes (âge de la liquidation de la pension). While 
workers took up their statutory pension at age 61.9 in 2003, this figure has gone down to 61.3 
in 2005 and 61.1 in 2006 and 200750. 
 
2.1.4 Critical assessment of reforms, discussions and research carried out 
The financial sustainability of the French pension system is now clearly at the centre of the 
political agenda. Because it is based to a very large extent on the PAYG mode of financing, 
the French pension system had been relatively spared by the financial crisis. The most 
remarkable effect of the financial crisis was that the assets of the reserve funds have dropped: 
the Fond de Réserve des Retraites, the state-run buffer fund posted a -24,9% loss in its assets 
in 2008, but in 2009 the assets increased by 15%. The reserve funds of the AGIRC and 
ARRCO supplementary schemes have also been affected, but the social partners have not 
provided the information about the evolution of these assets in 2009. Despite being relatively 
                                  
47
  ALBERT, Christophe, GRAVE, Nathanaël, OLIVEAU, Jean-Baptiste, « Surcote : les raisons d’un échec 
relatif », Retraite et Société, 54, juin 2008, pp. EUR 33-63. 
48
  AUBERT Patrick, BARTHELEMY Nadine, CHRISTEL Virginie, DUCOUDRE Bruno, LABORDE 
Charline, « Les retraités et les retraites en 2008 », Études et Résultats, Drees, n° 722, April 2010. 
49
  AUBERT Patrick, BARTHELEMY Nadine, CHRISTEL Virginie, DUCOUDRE Bruno, LABORDE 
Charline, « Les retraités et les retraites en 2008 », Études et Résultats, Drees, n° 722, April 2010. 
50
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/lfss/lfss2010/2010_plfss_pqe/2010_plfss_pqe_retraite_4_3.pdf. 
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spared by the financial crisis, the French pension system is not spared by the economic crisis 
that has resulted from the financial crisis. As a result of lower growth and higher 
unemployment, the deficits of the social insurance schemes have all increased. Another 
noticeable effect of the economic crisis is the fact that the debt has shot up. While debt 
represented 63,8% of GDP in 2007, it reached 75,8% in the third quarter of 2009 (INSEE 
data). The debt will increase further, because the French Government has decided to use its 
good credibility on financial markets to take out a “great loan” (grand emprunt) in order to 
boost investment in public infrastructure, higher education and new technologies. The scale of 
the deficits and that of the debt, but also the uncertainty about the speed and the extent of the 
expected economic recovery have contributed to a dramatisation of the financial situation of 
the French pension system and have prompted the Government to start a debate about a 
possible reform of the pension system in 2010. 
Over the last two years, the Government has been trying to focus the debate on one of the 
main challenges in the French pension system face, i.e. the labour market participation of the 
elderly. Increasing elderly workers’ employment rates is indeed vital to ensure the financial 
sustainability of the system. The employment rate of those aged 55-64 reached 38,3% in 
200851. This is way below the 50% Lisbon target. A set of measures tightening eligibility to 
early retirement schemes and providing incentives for postponing retirement has been taken in 
the 2009 bill on the financing of social security (LFSS 2009 - see part 2.1.1). The 2010 bill on 
the financing of social security (LFSS 2010) did not include new measures aimed at tackling 
early retirement of elderly workers, but it has underlined the will of the Government to 
implement the measures voted in the 2009 bill (LFSS 2009), particularly the introduction of a 
1% contribution on the wage bills of companies that will not have reached an agreement on 
the employment of elderly workers by 2010. It is too early to assess the impact these 
measures will have on elderly workers’ employment rates, but given the deteriorated situation 
in the labour market it is quite unlikely that the 50% Lisbon target will be reached in the near 
future. 
Labour market participation of the elderly is also at the centre of the debate about a 2010 
pension reform. An increase in the length of insurance required to get a full pension or an 
increase in the retirement age are seen as possible incentives for workers to work longer. 
Despite there being a controversy about the impact of an increase in the statutory retirement 
age (See Annual Report 2009), it would seem that such an increase could have a more potent 
effect on the labour market participation of the elderly than an increase in the length of 
insurance. While an increase in the length of insurance only has an influence on the supply of 
labour – because workers may indeed want to work longer in order to get an adequate pension 
level – an increase in the statutory retirement age may also have an impact on the demand of 
labour. If the retirement age is set at 60 years, employers know there is a risk that their 
workers will want to retire at that age and may as a result stop investing in the skills of elderly 
workers well before that age. An increase in the retirement age may have a cognitive impact 
on employers and send them a signal that workers aged 55 or more are still valuable resources 
and that investing in their human capital can still be beneficial for the company. An indicator 
of the possible need to increase the retirement age is the difference between the employment 
rate of workers aged 55-59 (56,3% in 2008) and those aged 60-64 (16,3% in 2008)52. There is 
clearly a gap between the two figures, which would seem to suggest that the current statutory 
retirement age (60 years) does contribute to a lower labour market participation of workers 
aged 60-64. 
                                  
51
  http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=98&ref_id=CMPTEF03135. 
52
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/lfss/lfss2010/2010_plfss_pqe/2010_plfss_pqe_retraite_4_1.pdf. 
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However, technical changes in the statutory retirement age or in the length of contribution 
may still prove insufficient to boost elderly workers’ employment rates. A crucial condition 
for the success of the strategy towards active elderly workers lies in the improvement of the 
working conditions of elderly workers. The working environments should be improved to 
meet the specific physical and psychological needs of workers who are reaching the end of 
their career. Moreover, more should be done on the investment in the skills of elderly 
workers. These issues are currently underestimated in the debate about pension reform.  
 
If the measures that are likely to be taken this year do not have a significant impact on the 
labour market prospects of elderly workers, their consequence might be that the level of 
future pensioners’ benefits will decrease and thus the adequacy of pensions will worsen. So 
far, the 2007 COR’s projections of future replacement rates predicted a relatively limited drop 
for standard workers (assumed to have a full contributory record of 40 years) in the régime 
général53 and more serious drops in the ARRCO and AGIRC schemes. However, the 
assumption according to which future pensioners will have a 40 year contribution record at 
retirement (and even a higher one with the gradual increase in the length of insurance required 
to get a full pension) seems relatively unrealistic for the growing proportion of workers who 
enter the labour market relatively late or are employed under temporary contracts, especially 
if the retirement age is kept at age 60. Providing simulations of replacement rates for these 
groups of workers – particularly women and younger age cohorts who have much more 
flexible career patterns than average production workers – would certainly help develop a 
better strategy to ensure the adequacy of pensions for them, be it based on changes in the 
parameters of the pension system or on labour market reforms. 
Strangely enough, the necessity to pay more attention to the link between workers’ status in 
the labour market and their status in terms of social protection seems also to be absent from 
the debate about the possibility to introduce the NDC technique into the French pension 
system. While such a reform would indeed bring a very well needed simplification of the 
French pension system, it is questionable whether in the long term an NDC will prove the 
right solution for providing workers with adequate incomes in retirement. In a context in 
which an increasing number of workers are employed in non-standard working arrangements 
and have to experience many spells of unemployment, it becomes increasingly difficult for a 
large part of the workforce to contribute to the pension system and even to benefit from non-
contributory periods. Even if pensioners could get ‘free’ contributions for non-contributory 
periods such as unemployment, maternity, etc. – as suggested by Bozio and Piketty -, a large 
proportion of the workforce – which arguably is the one that is most needy – might end up not 
benefiting from such redistributive elements. For instance, workers employed on fixed-term 
contracts who experience many spells of unemployment often fail to qualify for 
unemployment benefits and as a result decide not to become registered as unemployed. If the 
issue of adequacy is to be taken seriously in the French pension reform debate, more attention 
should be paid to the issue of the link between labour market status and status in terms of 
social protection. 
 
                                  
53
  According to the COR’s 2007 projections, the net replacement ratio will decline from about 83,6% (55,9% 
from régime général and 27,6% from ARRCO) for a standard worker retiring in 2003 to about 76,8% 
(51,8% from régime général and 25% from ARRCO) in 2020 and 73,5% in 2050, assuming a more 
generous indexation in AGIRC and ARRCO than the one introduced by the social partners in the mid-
nineties (See Annual Report 2009 for more details). In case the unfavourable indexation mechanisms in 
ARRCO were to be maintained, the net replacement ratio would decline to about 75,6% (51,8% from 
régime général and 23,8% from ARRCO) in 2020 and 64,4% in 2050 (50,1% from régime général and 
14,3% from ARRCO). 
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2.2 Health 
2.2.1  Overview of the system’s characteristics and reforms 
 
System characteristics54 
In France, the supply of health care is partially private (primary or ambulatory health care, 
certain hospitals or clinics – around 20% of the beds), and partially public (80% of hospital beds, 
but very few primary health care centres). It guarantees the patient's free choice of doctor, as well 
as the status of the liberal practice of medicine. In France, ambulatory care includes both 
general practitioners and specialists. 49% of the doctors in the ambulatory care sector are 
specialists. The compartmentalisation between ambulatory and hospital medicine is very 
marked, with the risks of a lack of coordination, of redundancy or even of contradictions in 
treatment. The number of hospital beds remains high in France (7.1 hospital beds per 1,000 
inhabitants and 3.6 beds for acute cases in 2007)55. 
Expenses are mainly assumed by the different health insurance funds and financed by social 
contributions and a specific tax, CSG (Contribution Sociale Généralisée). It is financed by 19 
basic sickness insurance funds, among which the CNAMTS (Caisse Nationale d'Assurance 
Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés - National Sickness Insurance Fund for the Salaried 
Workers) is the most important one covering 80% of the population. Basic sickness insurance 
funds are compulsory but do not cover all the costs, and are thus complemented by mutual 
health insurances, private and facultative (85% of the French population has one).  
To qualify for sickness insurance, the insured person must have worked a minimum number 
of hours in salaried employment during the period preceding the treatment. Each individual is 
supposed to be registered to the health insurance fund corresponding to his occupation. The 
coverage has been extended in 1999 to everybody by the creation of the CMU (Couverture 
Maladie Universelle – Universal Sickness Coverage), an income-tested health insurance. 
Sickness insurance covers the insured and his/her dependants (ayants-droits: spouse or 
common-law husband or wife, and children under 16, or 20 if they are still in full-time 
education or are disabled).  
Cash benefits (prestations en espèces or indemnités journalières) are intended to compensate 
for loss of earnings because of inability to work due to sickness. They are paid as from the 
third day of sick leave (délai de carence) for a maximum period of three years. The régime 
général's sickness cash benefits amounts to 50% of employees’ gross wages up to a ‘ceiling’, 
and are regularly uprated (EUR 2,885 per month in January 2010). The level of wage 
replacement is supplemented either by the employers (depending on the result of collective 
bargaining) or by the complementary schemes (mainly Mutuelles). 
Benefits in kind (prestations en nature) are delivered by the sickness insurance schemes 
through reimbursement for medical and pharmaceutical expenses, dental treatment, dentures, 
artificial limbs and so forth, and directly for hospital expenses. In ambulatory health care, 
provision is delivered on the basis of fee-for-service (paiement à l’acte). The fees for medical 
care and treatment are decided through agreement negotiated between the social security 
agencies (or funds) and medical practitioners' professional organisations. 
                                  
54
  This presentation of the system's characteristics is based on: Jean-Jacques Dupeyroux, Michel Borgetto, 
Robert Lafore, 2009, "Droit de la sécurité sociale" Paris, Dalloz-Sirey - Collection Precis dalloz (16th 
edition) and Bruno Palier, 2010, La réforme des systèmes de santé, Paris, PUF, Collection Que sais-je? (fifth 
edition). 
55
  (Source: OECD, Health data, 2009). 
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For medical and pharmaceutical expenses, the insured person initially settles the bill out of 
his/her pocket and is then partly reimbursed. Medical care and treatment are reimbursed at up 
to 65% of the charge in average. The remainder (co-payment), known as the ticket 
modérateur, varies between 20% and 60% of the total expense; it has to be paid by the 
patient. This system is supposed to encourage people to moderate their demands. However, 
complementary insurance (Mutuelles) very often reimburses the cost of the ticket modérateur. 
Today, 85% of people pay for a complementary health care insurance. A further 7% of the 
French population gets an income tested free complementary insurance (Couverture Maladie 
Universelle Complémentaire). 
 
When in-patient care is required, the insured person pays a daily fixed amount to cover the 
cost of food and accommodation (forfait hospitalier = EUR 18 per day in 2010). Since 2008, 
public hospitals receive funding based on their activity (tarification à l’activité) from the 
Regional Hospital Agencies (Agence Régionale de l'Hospitalisation) and the Sécurité sociale 
to cover their medical expenses. 
 
Reforms 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, in France, health care expenditures have increased much 
faster than the economy grew. The first main response to this trend has not been 
retrenchment, but has long been to increase social contribution paid to health insurance funds. 
By the mid 1980s, increasing the social contribution appeared an economic dead end, and 
attempts were made to limit the growth of health insurance expenditure and to reduce the 
deficits of the health insurance funds. Cost containment policies in the French health 
insurance system have two main aspects: the introduction of a capped budget for health 
expenditures and a decrease in health risk coverage.  
In the 1980s conventional negotiations between the Government and medical professions took 
place, the Minister for Social Affairs tried to impose a ‘global volume envelope’ in order to 
try to link the growth of expenditure in ambulatory care to economic growth. This goal was 
accepted by the Sickness insurance fund (CNAMTS) which then negotiated with the medical 
unions in exchange for the creation of the so-called “sector 2” (secteur 2). Doctors in this 
sector are able to charge higher fees than those reimbursed by the sickness funds (on "over-
billing", see next sections), the difference being paid directly by the patient. But only one 
medical union accepted this system. The biggest union was clearly against it. Because of this 
opposition, the global volume envelope was never implemented. In 1983 a global budget for 
hospitals was introduced in an attempt to control costs in this sector. 
After the 1988 presidential election the new government, headed by Michel Rocard, wanted 
to negotiate regulation. This strategy also corresponded to a reorientation of regulation away 
from a financial to a medicalised logic, based on the medical evaluation of therapeutic 
activities. It was only introduced in the new convention signed in October 1993. An objective 
of cost growth was fixed (3,4%), as were “medical references”. If a doctor did not conform 
with these therapeutic norms he could be penalised. But these changes were limited. The main 
point is that doctors could not be penalised automatically if the aimed fixed rate was overshot. 
The limited effects of such negotiated cost containment policies in France explain the 
introduction of a capped budget for all health insurance expenditures in the 1996 reform (plan 
Juppé) which imposed an annual vote on national health spending objectives (ONDAM – 
Objectif National de Dépenses d'Assurances Maladie – National Target for Sickness 
Insurance Expenditures) on every sector of the health insurance system (ambulatory and 
hospital care). 
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Meanwhile, the public coverage of health expenditures has decreased between 1980 and 2010, 
from 79,4% to 76% in general, but more specifically on ambulatory care expenditure (see 
below), because of the reduction of reimbursement rates for patients and of the creation of 
direct patient co-payments for health care services (creation of the hospital flat rate co-
payment in 1982, increases in patients’ co-payment for medical consultation, drugs and 
medical analysis). The 2004 reform again raised the co-payment for patients: it planned to 
increase the hospital fee by EUR 1 per year until 2007. It has been increased again in 2010, up 
to EUR 18 per day. The 2004 reform also introduced a new EUR 1 co-payment for medical 
consultation (called franchise because it cannot be reimbursed by the Mutual insurances), and 
it implemented de-reimbursement of drugs. Unless you are under acute care (and then almost 
fully covered), the level of patient co-payment was raised to 30% for medical consultation, to 
40% for drugs and to 20% for hospitalisation. In 2008, new franchises have been created on 
drugs (EUR 0.50 per box), biological exams and transportation (EUR 2 per act and per 
transport). 
If patients have to pay more out of their pocket, doctors have benefitted from increase in the 
value of their fees. In 2002, France’s general practitioners (GPs) actually went on strike for 
higher fees (EUR 20 per consultation). The raising of the fees was accepted by the new 
Minister for Health, at a time when the deficit of the health insurance system was already 
growing! Since then, the fees for doctors have been regularly increased, to reach the level of 
EUR 23 per consultation for generalists in 2010, and EUR 27 for the specialists in 2010. The 
most recent example being that in 2010, a strike has been organised by the general 
practitioners, who then obtained the most recent increase of their fees (from EUR 22 to EUR 
23). 
Beyond trying to control costs, the governments have also tried to reorganise the French 
health care system. In 2004 a new law on health insurance was voted by the French 
Parliament in a context of a huge deficit of the health insurance system (EUR 10.6 billion in 
2003, EUR 11.6 billion in 2004; EUR 8.3 billion expected for 2005). This reform embodied 
no new constraint for doctors (for their activity, for prescriptions or for installation) and gave 
specialists the right to get higher fees when patients consult them directly, without being 
addressed by a GP. The main effort was again being asked from patients, in the form of 
raising co-payments and taxes, and asking them to choose a médecin traitan" (regular treating 
Doctor) and see him/her first before doing anything else.  
In France the 1996 reform made it possible for GPs to act as gatekeepers for patients who 
agree to contract with them (médecins référents). However this system was replaced by 
another (médecin traitant) in 2004, geared to making GPs the “drivers” of patients in the 
health system. All French insured persons now have to choose their médecin traitant (it is 
usually a GP, but it can be a specialist). It will cost them more if they consult a specialist 
directly without being addressed by their main GP. In 2010, the health insurance funds was 
only reimbursing 30% of the consultation fees when the visit to doctor was not authorised by 
the médecin traitant. 
In the hospital sector, one sees trends of managerialisation of the hospital sector and the 
creation of new State agencies. In France this managerialisation process began with the 1991 
law. The purpose of the law was to make hospital regulation take into account the real activity 
of hospitals (importing into France the “Diagnosis Related Group” method from the US). 
With this reform each hospital’s budget was to depend upon an evaluation of its activity and 
its prospective development, both to be negotiated with the State. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, two new tools for evaluation have been introduced: the “Programme of Medicalised 
Information Systems” (geared to evaluating the activity of each hospital and to introducing 
payment systems based on diagnosis related groups) and “Medical References” for 
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ambulatory care (containing therapeutic norms and norms for prescription). The 1996 reform 
further promoted and generalised the evaluation of therapies in the health insurance system 
with the creation of a National Agency for Accreditation and Evaluation in Health (ANAES), 
recently incorporated within the new top authority on health (Haute Autorité en Santé) created 
in 2004. Regional hospital agencies (Agences Régionales d’Hospitalisation) have also been 
created to distribute budgets between hospitals, based on an evaluation of the performance of 
every hospital. These agencies also have the right to close inefficient hospitals after an 
accreditation enquiry.  
The law entitled Hôpital, patients, santé, territoires (Hospital, patients, health and territories - 
HPST), presented by the Government at the end of 2008 and was finally adopted in July 2009 
is a continuation of this decentralisation and regionalisation trend, as well as 
managerialisaiton of hospital trends. This law lead to the creation of Regional Health 
Authorities (Agences Régionales de Ssanté) as of 1 April 2010, in charge of directing and 
coordinating health policies at the regional level, and to give more power to the hospital 
directors (this latter point being fiercely criticised by the medical profession, and being 
progressively amended by the Government during parliamentary debates). The idea is to 
reenforce the power of the hospital director, in order to better support a coherent policy and a 
better articulation between the various establishments (public and private) on the same 
territory. In the same direction, Regional Health Autorities (Aagences Régionales de Santé) 
have been created to be in charge of the health policy at the regional level. They should 
coordinate and improve prevention policy; they should control and improve the territorial 
distribution of health professionals and try to better articulate ambulatory care and hospital. 
They would also be in charge of the control of the quality of health care by collecting data on 
health and by improving professional practices. Brought under the authority of a new pilot of 
health policies to the regional level (with the image of a “prefect” of health), joining together 
various local administrations, the objective is to set up a true coherent policy of health at 
regional level, including guaranteeing equal access to health care, a better effectiveness of the 
expenditure or a better distribution of professionals on the territory. It took a long time to 
adopt this law because of the various protests by the medical profession, especially opposed 
to the attempt at restricting their freedom of settlement, or to the empowerment of hospital 
directors (who are not doctors but civil servants). 
In June 2009, the main health insurance fund (CNAMTS), for its part, has proposed an 
important new modality of pay for GPs, with the establishment of the contract for 
improvement of individual practices (CAPI), adopted in late 2009 by one third of doctors 
concerned. The contract is supposed to promote premium payment based on performance. In 
this frame GPs are being rewarded with a bonus of up to EUR 7 per patient if they achieve the 
objectives set in an agreement in compliance with following recommendations formulated by 
the High Authority for Health: Vaccination against influenza for persons of more than 65 
years, screening breast cancer for women over 50 years, increased generic prescriptions and 
better monitoring of chronic diseases (diabetes and hypertension). 
 
2.2.2  Overview of debates/political discourse  
The main debate on the French health care system has been around the new law on Hôpital, 
patients, santé, territoire. In 2007 and early 2008, debates (within EGOS, Etats généraux de 
l'Organisation de la Santé) have been organised to prepare this new structural reform that was 
presented at Parliament in February 2009. Most of 2009 was spent in discussing the 
legislation in Parliament, where a lot of amendments have been proposed under the pressure 
of French doctors. As a consequences of these pressures, attempts at better regulating doctors’ 
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settlement in France (in order to fight inequalities of access) has been blocked, as well as the 
empowerment of hospital directors or the supervisory board (conseil de surveillance). 
As stated in a recent report produced by IRDES for the Health Policy Monitor56: “The major 
issue which created a lot of conflict was the distribution of power between health insurance 
funds and new Regional Health Authorities (ARS). Until now the national and regional health 
insurance funds were the only interlocutor/actors in negotiating with physicians and defining 
the politics of care provision in the ambulatory sector. With the fear of losing ground and 
power, they did everything to limit the power given to the Agences Régionales de Santé, but 
have not been successful”. 
The IRDES continues in summarising the positions of the various actors in the debate: 
“Physicians: Reactions by physicians have differed; those working in public hospitals and in 
the ambulatory sector have reacted with a rare vehemence to this law. There were many 
demonstrations before and during the debate in Parliament. Hospital physicians feared mainly 
that they will lose their managerial power in hospitals with new management rules and in a 
more competitive environment where they may lose their advantages. Ironically the 
physicians in private clinics and famous surgeons joined the movement when the amendment 
was voted for controlling extra fees for patients in private clinics. They have been successful 
in lobbying to remove this amendment. Ambulatory care doctors on the other hand were of 
course fiercely against the idea of imposing limits to the physicians' liberty of installation”. 
“Patient associations: Initially supporting the law, patient associations were extremely 
disappointed by the modifications made under pressure by the medical profession. In 
particular concerning the chapter on access to care, patients are the losers of the legislative 
process. The major patient association has published an open letter to the parliamentarians 
(“Letter to the parliamentarians who stopped representing us”) deploring the refusal of several 
amendments: 
 
• The refusal to take any official measures to detect and sanction doctors who refuse to 
treat patients with CMU coverage,  
• The refusal to control overbilling in private clinics, 
• The refusal to introduce more strict measures to force doctors in ambulatory-care to 
improve after-hour care.” 
 
The way the French Government has dealt with the swine flue has also lead to an important 
public debate in France. The minister has been fiercely criticised for having bought way too 
many vaccines (95 million) when only 5 million shots have been realised.  
The annual report of the Cour des comptes (Public Financial Auditing Court) on the French 
social protection system57 was in 2009 focused on the hospital sector. As every year it 
underlined the recurrent problem of the deficit of the Sécurité sociale (EUR 1.4 billion for 
health insurance) due to an increase of 3,5% in health expenditure in 2008, despite an increase 
in resources. The accumulated deficits are amounting to an increasing debt which is more and 
more costly to reimburse. As for hospital, the Court criticises the disparities in hospital 
management’s result, the lack of efficiency in the management of certain hospitals. The report 
expressed the hope that future reforms will help improve the management of hospitals into 
poles, as well as the diffusion of good practices. It also criticises the complexity and opacity 
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of the implementation of the tariff system based on hospital activity (Tarification à l’activité) 
in France.  
 
2.2.3  Impact assessment 
The last report of the Commission des comptes de la Sécurité sociale (Commission on Social 
Security Accounts) published in September 2009 states that the deficit of the compulsory 
health insurance has been: EUR -5.9 billion in 2006, EUR -4.6 billion in 2007, and EUR -4.2 
billion in 2008. The deficit should be more important in 2009 because of the economic slow 
down and because of the swine flue. There is however no data produced so far on final 
accounts for 2009. First trends for 2010 show a deep increase in health expenditure: + 4,1% 
during the first trimester, when they are supposed to grow only by 3%. 
Next to future financial problems to come, inequalities in health are still also a major problem 
for the French health care system. France has a very high social gradient in health. As a study 
published by the French institute for statistics (INSEE) in 2005 has shown, life expectancy at 
the age of 35 years is 7 years higher for male white-collar employees (cadres) than for male 
blue-collar workers. If this gap is lower and stable among women, it has increased among 
men over the last 15 years58. Recent research confirms these data. As explained below, this 
research identifies the organisation of the health care system and its reforms as one of the 
cause of inequalities in health59.  
This increase can partly be explained by the health care financial reforms. In order to ensure 
the financial viability of the system, all governments since the 1990s have decided to limit 
and diminish the re-imbursement guaranteed by compulsory health insurance, thus leaving 
more costs to be covered by French patients. This has given a growing importance to out-of-
pocket payments, which are partly covered by the voluntary/complementary health 
insurances. As shown by IRDES, complementary health insurance covers 12,9% of the 
expenditure, and 9,1% of the costs remain to be paid by the insured. However, only 84,9% of 
the French population are covered by a complementary scheme, 7,4% are covered by the 
complementary universal sickness scheme (CMUC) and 7,7% do not have any 
complementary insurance60. The remaining ones are to be found among low income groups. 
As shown by the French Observatory on inequalities (Observatoire des inégalités), 10% of 
workers and employees of small companies do not have complementary health insurance 
(mutuelle) and 22% of the poorest do not have such insurance, whereas the rate is at 7,7% for 
the whole population. Among the persons living under the poverty rate (60% of median 
income) and being under the age of 50, 21% have not seen a doctor during the year before, 
whereas the rate is 17% for the rest of the population. 53% of the poorest did not consult a 
specialist, whereas it was only 40% for the rest of the population61. These data indicate a 
postponement (and sometimes even renouncing) of access to health care system in France for 
the poorest, despite the implementation of the universal sickness scheme (CMU). Recent 
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studies reported also by the Observatoire des inégalités show moreover that a lot of doctors 
refuse to treat patients with CMU, mainly because they cannot overcharge them (implement a 
“dépassement d’honoraire”).  
Another critical issue in the access to health care is the fact that the distribution of doctors is 
very uneven on the French territory, as this has also been pointed out several times by the 
High Council for the future of Health Insurance (Haut Conseil sur l'Avenir de l'Assurance 
Maladie). The density of liberal specialists is 88 for 100,000 inhabitants in France, but only 
34 in the Départment Lozère and 244 in Paris62. This is partly due to the fact that in France, 
doctors can settle where they want, with no regulation. In 2006, the Government announced 
in the media his intention to develop a way to refuse installation where too many doctors were 
already settled, but doctor apprentices went on strike and the Government withdrew his 
proposal. Within the new law Hôpital, patients santé et territoires, the Government was 
planning new forms of incentives for doctors to settle in cities and regions which are lacking 
of doctors. However, due to protest by the medical profession, the Government has again 
withdrawn any coercive measure as reported above. 
 
2.2.4  Critical assessment of reforms 
The critical assessment of the French health care system is still the same. As shown with the 
strong debate and lobbying around the law Hôpital, patients, santé et territoires, the main 
critique to be made on the recent French reforms of the health care sector is the ongoing 
absence of capacity of the State to regulate the sector against the will of the medical 
profession. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, when it was presented the law contained a lot of 
orientation fitting with the objectives agreed in the OMC (better distribution of doctors over 
the territory to improve equality of access, limiting overbilling to restrain financial 
discrimination, empowerment of hospital directors and creation of regional health agencies to 
improve the coherence and consistency of health policies, better coordination between 
ambulatory and hospital care, improved prevention…). However, during the long lasting 
discussion of this law (which started in February 2009 and finished in July 2009), the medical 
professions organised several strikes in hospitals, mass demonstrations and intense lobbying, 
so that on the 12th of May, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, felt obliged to announce 
many concessions to the medical professions (such as a weakening of the future power of the 
hospital directors), that all undermine the main innovation within the law. 
Of special importance is the incapacity to improve equal access to health care in the French 
system. Inequalities in Health is one of the major drawbacks of the French health care system, 
but it does not seem to be preoccupying so much the Government since no serious attempt to 
overcome these have been implemented, and all the little efforts planned within the Law 
Hôpital, patients santé et territoires have been withdrawn under the pressure of the medical 
profession.  
As stated in the previous section, these inequalities are partly due to the increasing role of the 
private complementary health insurance, not accessible to all. The publicly funded scheme to 
compensate for the lack of a complementary health insurance (CMU see above) is not 
preventing discrimination and inequalities in access to health though.  
Indeed, various tests and studies63 accomplished under the authority of the Fonds CMU have 
shown that doctors who are allowed to overbill their patient (charging a fee which is higher 
than the standard fixed tariff reimbursed by the health insurance fund) tend to deny access to 
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their practice to CMU holders. A test implemented by the fund in charge of the financing of 
the CMU has shown that 41% of the specialists and 39% of the dentists (most of them 
practicing over-billing), refuse to treat patients covered by the universal sickness scheme 
(CMUC) since they cannot overbill them64. Overbilling has become a major phenomenon in 
the French health care system. A report elaborated by the General Inspectorate of Social 
Affairs (IGAS) in the year 2007 shows an important increase in the practice of over-billing in 
the past 10 years and which has shown that out of around EUR 18 billion of fees paid to 
doctors in the ambulatory sector, more than EUR 2 billion are due to the practice of 
overbilling65. Here again, the Government planned to try to limit overbilling by creating a 
formal and better controlled sector were overbilling would be accepted but regulated. Under 
the pressure of the medical profession, all regulation has been postponed until 2013… 
The other pitfall of the dominance of the medical profession over the health care policy 
decision-making is that all measures aimed at guaranteeing the financial sustainability of the 
French system add on the burden of the patients (increase of franchises and co-payment, 
increasing role of private health insurances) whereas many attempts at regulating the supply 
of health is opposed by the professions. As mentioned already, in April 2010, general 
practitioners went again on strike, and obtained a new increase in their fees, without any 
counter concession. 
 
2.3 Long-term care 
2.3.1 Overview of the system’s characteristics and reforms 
French public provision for the long-term care needs of the dependent elderly and the disabled 
relies on a two-pronged system. On the one hand, the health insurance scheme covers the cost 
of health care provided in an institutional setting to the dependent elderly or to disabled 
patients. It also finances long-term care units in hospitals, as well as nursing care provided in 
the patient’s home. Such health care costs are paid for directly by the health insurance 
scheme, i.e. patients do not need to advance the money themselves. 
On the other hand, two schemes, essentially financed by the State and by local authorities, 
provide social benefits to the dependent elderly and to the disabled to help them meet some of 
the cost of care that is not covered by health insurance, whether that care is provided in 
institutions or in a domiciliary setting.  
The dependent elderly can receive the Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie – APA 
(Personalised Autonomy Benefit) which is a universal benefit for people over 60 that came 
into force in 2002. This benefit is calculated based on a “help plan” designed for each 
individual, on the basis of the assessment of the person’s needs. The APA benefit is intended 
to cover part of the cost of the “help plan”, the rest (about one quarter of the total amount on 
average) is paid by the beneficiary through user fees which increase proportionally to the 
elderly’s income. Elderly people with an income below EUR 689.50 per month do not pay 
user fees. The benefit amount thus varies both according to the person’s level of dependency 
(established by a socio-medical team, using a nation-wide unified grid – the AGGIR grid) and 
according to the elderly’s financial resources.  
In June 2009, 1,117,000 dependant elderly received the APA benefit, of which 61% lived in 
their own homes and 39% lived in an institutional setting. The average amount of the “help 
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plan” for people living at home was EUR 494 per month (EUR 1,009 on average for the most 
dependant and EUR 348 for the least dependant), of which around EUR 120 is covered by the 
beneficiary through user fees (DREES, 200966). 
For the disabled, a new benefit came into force in January 2006, called the Prestation de 
Compensation du Handicap – PCH - (Disability compensation benefit) which aims to better 
cover the needs of the disabled whatever the causes of the disability and the age or life-style 
of the person. This benefit is intended to help cover the needs of the disabled person whether 
those needs have to do with professional insertion, home adaptation, human and technical 
aids, etc. This benefit replaces the previous ACTP (third person compensatory benefit) 
although those who already received the ACTP can continue to remain under that scheme if 
they so wish. 
End of June 2009, 71.700 people were receiving the PCH, compared to 43,000 in 2008, which 
represents a 67% increase over a year. This sharp increase can be attributed both to the fact 
that some people who previously were covered under the ACTP scheme transferred to the 
PCH benefit, as well as to the fact that this new benefit is open to a larger category of people 
than the former ACTP scheme (the ACTP was only open to people over the age of 20, 
whereas the PCH can also be claimed by children regardless of age). The average monthly 
cost of this benefit was EUR 980 in June 2009.  
There were also 99,600 recipients of the former ACTP scheme at that date, thus amounting to 
a total of 171,300 recipients of disability benefits in June 2009 (DREES, 2009). 
The financing of long-term care policy is borne by the health insurance system (60%) and the 
départements (20%). The state intervenes mostly through fiscal measures. The Caisse 
nationale de solidarité pour l’autonomie – CNSA – (National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy) 
which was set up in 2005 receives specific contributions (a fraction of the General Social 
Contribution - CSG – Contribution sociale généralisée, as well as the Solidarity Contribution 
for Autonomy - CSA), which are added to the other sources of financing (Vasselle, 200867). 
The mix and overlap of competence between the different actors in the field of long-term care 
(départements, state, CNSA, health insurance, etc.) is thus important and complicate decision-
making and long-term planning with regards to the financing of long-term care, and raise 
issues as to the long-term sustainability of this mode of financing. However, the creation of 
the CNSA in 2005 has helped to centralise a greater share of the resources devoted to long-
term care by the various actors. 
Several issues have become the focus of public debate: 1) insufficient public resources; 2) the 
lack of a coherent mode of financing and governance; 3) an insufficient number of places in 
institutions, and 4) the excessive remaining costs that individuals have to meet themselves. 
The issue of the quality of the care provided has recently also come into the limelight.  
In order to deal with the insufficient number of places in institutions, the Plan Solidarité-
Grand Âge was adopted in 2006 and is due to last until 2012. It was initially intended to 
provide an extra EUR 2.3 billion to the health insurance scheme, but its cost has been re-
evaluated to EUR 4 billion (of which EUR 0.9 billion for the creation of extra places and 
EUR 2.6 billion for the medicalisation effort). As of 2008, the number of beds created 
annually in institutions for the dependent elderly has been raised from 5,000 to 7,500 in order 
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to maintain the same equipment ratio despite the ageing of the population (467 places per 
1,000 inhabitants over 85 years old) (Vasselle, 2008). 
The other issues (insufficient public resources; lack of coherent mode of financing and 
governance; excessive remaining costs that individuals have to meet themselves) have so far 
not been dealt with. The President announced at the end of 2007 that a bill would be proposed 
to the Parliament early 2008 concerning the creation of a fifth social insurance branch, aiming 
at covering the loss of autonomy for the disabled and the elderly. A senatorial information 
mission was set up in order to follow up on the preparatory work around this proposed 
scheme. The senatorial mission published its report in July 2008 (the 2008 Vasselle Report). 
However, the adoption of the bill relative to this fifth social insurance scheme (“l’assurance 
cinquième risque”) has been postponed several times, first to October 2009, then to the first 
half of 2010, and now it has been announced that it will not be discussed before 2011, after 
the pension reform has been passed at the end of 2010.  
 
2.3.2 Overview of debates and the political discourse 
Due to the postponement of the long-term care reform, debates in the past year have 
continued to revolve around the creation of this new social insurance branch for the 
dependency risk and especially around the report published by the senatorial information 
mission (Vasselle report) in July 2008. This report puts forward a certain number of proposals 
structured around four main axes:  
1. A more equitable effort towards those receiving domiciliary care:  
• Raise the benefit ceiling for certain targeted groups (isolated people and those 
suffering from neuro-degenerative diseases) 
• Improve the AGGIR-grid so that it can be applied in a more homogenous way across 
the country, or even replace it with a new system 
• Place greater demands on those with higher assets by giving them the choice, when 
they become dependent, between receiving the APA benefit at 50% of its normal level 
or receiving a full APA but having EUR 20,000 taken off their inheritance (based on 
the fraction of assets above EUR 150,000). 
2. Containing the costs that have to be met by individuals themselves and promoting more 
efficient spending in institutions. 
3. Defining the articulation between national solidarity and private insurance. 
• Set up a joint procedure between public agencies and private insurances for the 
release of benefits in case of dependency 
• Guarantee the “portability” of contracts from one private insurance to another 
• Allow for fiscal deductions on complementary contributions towards dependency 
made to private pension saving funds  
• Open up the possibility to convert life insurances into dependency insurances at no 
extra cost to the individual 
• Think about ways to open the possibility for people with low or medium incomes to 
take out a private insurance 
4. Reinforcing and simplifying the governance of long-term care policy. 
• Set up an equal share of financing of the APA between the State (CNSA) and the 
départements. 
• Modify the process of equalisation of resources of the APA financial envelope in 
order to guarantee a more equal burden on the départements. 
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This idea of a stronger reliance on private insurance has become quite predominant in the 
public debate, even more so now in the aftermath of the economic crisis, with the 
Government highlighting the difficulty in financing such a reform in the present context of 
economic crisis and important public deficits.  
The French Federation of Insurance Companies (FFSA) has been lobbying strongly for the 
expansion of private insurance in the field of long-term care and has put forth a number of 
proposals to that effect, urging the Government to act faster on this issue. 
The development of private insurance receives some opposition from the political Left who 
favours a universal public social insurance scheme and warns against the idea of “punishing” 
those with higher assets (by cutting in half the amount of their APA benefit or by reclaiming 
EUR 20,000 from their inheritance – see proposal above) as this runs counter to the principle 
of national solidarity and runs the risk of recreating the same problems (especially that of non 
take-up) that existed with the former Prestation Spécifique Dépendance (PSD)68.  
France has nonetheless already become the biggest market in Europe for private insurance in 
the field of long-term care, with over 3 million people insured, making it the second biggest 
market in the world behind the US (Vasselle, 2008). 
 
2.3.3 Impact assessment 
Amongst the main issues that have been at the forefront of public debate, the issue of the costs 
that users have to meet themselves for the care they receive, especially in institutions, has 
been particularly central.  
As was mentioned in the French 2009 annual report, the most recent opinion survey carried 
out by TNS-Sofres on the topic of old age69 shows that an overwhelming proportion of the 
population (76%) feels it would not be able to cover the monthly average costs for residential 
care if one of their parents were to resort to this solution.  
This survey also indicated that there is a real lack of confidence on the part of the population 
regarding the public authorities’ capacity to deal with the issue of dependency. Thus, nearly 
three out of four people (71%) feel that the public authorities in France do not deal 
satisfactorily with the problem of dependency. This opinion has been in constant progression 
since 2004 (+16 points over the past five years). Furthermore, this critique has become 
increasingly severe: in 2004, less than one French out of five (14%) strongly condemned the 
action of the public authorities (“not at all satisfactory”). In 2009, 22% denounced a serious 
deficit of public policy. The constant postponing of public action in the field of long-term care 
financing can be expected to worsen the population’s perception of the public authorities’ 
action on this issue. 
A report came out in October 200970 providing an analysis of the out-of-pocket costs charged 
to residents of residential homes for the frail elderly. This report shows that there are wide 
differences in costs from one establishment to another, and that the actual costs that residents 
must meet are considerably higher than the figures usually presented. Based on the survey 
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they carried out in four départements, the authors of the report show that the sum of EUR 
1,500 often presented as the average monthly costs that residents must meet themselves71 
corresponds in fact to some sort of irreducible minimum which only applies to people who 
limit their spending as much as possible and who live in residences in rural areas where both 
the land and the infrastructure have already been paid off. In urban areas, remaining costs for 
residents of EUR 2,900 per month is not unusual and does not correspond to particularly 
luxurious services. The average amount lies around EUR 2,200, which is much higher than 
the average pension level which lies at around EUR 1,200 per month. This puts a strong 
pressure on the dependant elderly’s savings and most importantly on their relatives. 
However, the authors warn against putting these two figures together (average cost and 
average pension), as there is in fact no link between the two. As they show, except for those 
who depend on social assistance, there is no direct link between the out-of-pocket costs for 
residents and their income level: people with high income can be admitted into residential 
homes habilitated to receive elderly people who depend on social assistance and which offer 
reasonable tariffs and quality services, while many elderly with limited income are faced with 
very limited local choice between high priced residences.  
The dependant elderly can receive different types of financial help: fiscal benefits, housing 
benefits and social aid benefits for accommodation. However, these three schemes are very 
heterogeneous, there are attributed by different financing instances (the State for the fiscal 
benefits, the National fund for family benefits for the housing benefits, and the regional 
authorities for the social aid benefits) and are not articulated with each other. Furthermore, 
they have not been created specifically for the purpose of meeting the needs of residential care 
for the elderly and follow their own individual logics. There are thus wide disparities in terms 
of what the elderly receive, based on geographical factors, type of residence and access to 
information. 
The authors of the report thus highlight the often great difficulty for the dependant elderly and 
their relatives in meeting out-of-pocket costs for residential care, not least as it is very 
difficult to predict in advance the length of stay in residential care, and thus the total cost for 
the elderly and his/her relatives.  
Another issue that has come to the fore is that of the quality of the care provided, both in 
institutional and in domiciliary settings.  
With respect to institutional care, the above-mentioned report shows how random the system 
is with respect to costs and quality: high tariffs by no means guarantee a satisfactory quality, 
just as low tariffs do not exclude it.  
Another report also published by the General Inspectorate for Social Affairs (Inspection 
Générale des Affaires Sociales – IGAS) in October 200972 provides a survey of quality in the 
field of – non-medical - domiciliary care services for the elderly. The authors show that while 
quality is emphasised at all levels, there is actually no coherent mode of quality control. First 
of all, no unified legislation on domiciliary care services exists. These can be set up under two 
different types of legislation, and the quality requirements imposed are further laid down in a 
variety of texts and procedures. Domiciliary care companies themselves sometimes set up 
their own certification procedures and labels. According to the authors of the report, all these 
rules and regulations are simply piled up on each other without bringing any added value and 
remain purely procedural, not least as quality controls are only carried out in the form of desk 
                                  
71
  This figure is given for instance in the 2008 Vasselle report. 
72
  ROUSSILLE Bernadette, STROHL Hélène, RAYMOND Michel, Enquête sur les conditions de la qualité 
des services d'aide à domicile pour les personnes âgées, Inspection générale des affaires sociales (IGAS), 02 
October 2009, 145 p. 
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audits and never based on interviews with the recipients. The authors also highlight the 
limited power of the Conseil Général73 over the domiciliary care providers despite being in 
charge of the Personalised Autonomy Benefit (APA). This problem is further accentuated by 
the implication of numerous state services in this field without any real coordination between 
them. Finally, quality control is rendered difficult by the fact that domiciliary care is often 
provided through private (person to person) contracts. This is paradoxically the case for the 
most dependant elderly in need of a large number of care hours, who, although they would 
benefit more than others from relying on an operational provider to coordinate their service 
needs, often resort to direct employment (private person to person contracts) as a less costly 
option. 
 
2.3.4 Critical assessment of reforms 
It is as yet not possible to provide a critical assessment of the reforms carried out as these 
have been once again postponed and although the Vasselle report outlines some reform 
proposals (cf. above 2.3.2), the content of the bill that will eventually be presented is not yet 
known. 
What can be said about the present situation, however, is that access to care still remains an 
issue, both because of a lack of places in institutional settings and because of the high out-of-
pocket costs that remain for individuals and their family.  
As regards the cost of care, despite an increase in public coverage for the costs of long term 
care, households stand for at least EUR 7 billion per year over what is covered through public 
schemes to meet the cost of long-term care: EUR 650 million in co-payments (ticket 
modérateur) for domiciliary care provided through the APA scheme, EUR 700 million in 
copayments for care provided in institutions, and EUR 5.7 billion for accommodation in long-
term care facilities (Vasselle, 2008). This - according to the Vasselle report - low-range 
estimation of the cost for households does not take into account spending on services that are 
not included in the domiciliary care aid plans (Vasselle, 2008), i.e. all the domiciliary 
personal services (home-help, house-cleaning, etc.) which elderly people whose needs are not 
covered or insufficiently covered through the APA scheme must buy privately.  
The use of such supplementary domiciliary personal services has admittedly been facilitated 
by the development of tax-deduction schemes, but the possibility to make use of this scheme 
remains very much income-related, with high-income earners benefiting more than other 
groups from this possibility. This raises issues in terms of equality of access to what are 
essentially publicly financed (or at least strongly subsidised) services (cf. CERC, 200874). 
Furthermore, the issue of the quality of care provided, both in institutional and domiciliary 
settings, is not addressed in these reform proposals. 
 
                                  
73
  Assembly of the départment. 
74
  CERC (2008), Les services à la personne, Rapport n° 8, La documentation française, 2008. 
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3 Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Social 
Protection 
 
The crisis has clearly had an impact on the financing of social protection programmes. In 
2008, the deficit of régime général (i.e. the most encompassing public social security 
scheme75) reached EUR 10.2 billion. According to governmental projections76 that have been 
carried out before the submission of the project on the 2010 bill on the financing of social 
security (Projet de loi de financement de la sécurité sociale 2010 – PLFSS 2010), the deficit 
of the régime général will attain EUR 23.5 billionin 2009 and EUR 30.6 billion in 2010, if the 
measures introduced by PLFSS 2010 are taken into account. Without these measures, the 
deficit would reach EUR 33.6 billion. It is estimated that the general health insurance scheme 
(managed by the CNAM – Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie) will run a EUR 11 billion 
deficit in 2009, while the general wage-earners’ pension scheme (managed by the CNAV – 
Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse) should run a EUR 8.1 billion deficit77. These 
deficits are largely due to the impact of the crisis on the revenues of the social protection 
system. The Government estimates the loss in revenues for social security in 2009 and 2010 
due to the economic crisis at EUR 21 billion. The “crisis deficit” represents approximately 
65% of the deficit in 2009 and 75% of the deficit in 2010. 
So far, social protection schemes have officially considered as an automatic stabiliser during 
the economic crisis. The Government has decided: first, not to increase contribution rates or 
taxes used to finance social security (particularly the General Social Contribution – CSG – 
Contribution Sociale Généralisée which is also levied on capital income); second, not to 
finance social security’s deficits via the budget; and, finally, it says that it does not intend to 
make significant cuts in social protection schemes78. One of the few cases of an increase in 
taxes is the introduction of the forfait social (“social flat contribution”) which will be levied 
on occupational private savings schemes and on company-level private pension schemes79 
The Government justifies its decision not to increase contributions and taxes because it could 
affect employment and growth80 (see IRP 2009, p. 72). However, the decision not to finance 
via the budget the deficits incurred by social security schemes, means that social protection 
schemes need to take loans and such an important increase in their debt casts doubt on their 
long-term sustainability. 
Apart from the impact it has had on current revenues of social security schemes, the crisis 
could also indirectly affect the future revenues of the schemes, because of its impact on the 
assets of the French pension system’s buffer funds. This may of course affect the long-term 
sustainability of the French pension system. As already stated in the French Annual National 
Report 2009 (p. 11 and p. 28), the public pension schemes’ buffer fund (FRR - Fond de 
Réserve pour les Retraites) which is supposed to contribute to the financing of statutory 
pension schemes between 2020 and 2040 had reported at the end of March 2009 that its long-
term annual performance (beginning in 2004) had become negative (-1,2%). However, since 
                                  
75
  Which includes health insurance and work accident insurance (CNAMTS – Caisse Nationale d’Assurance 
Maladie), pensions (CNAV – Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse) and family benefits (CNAF – Caisse 
Nationale des Allocations familiales). 
76
  http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/conseil-des-ministres-du-14-octobre-2009 ; 
http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/ccss/2009/ccss200910presse.pdf. 
77
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/ccss/2009/ccss200910presse.pdf (P. 7). 
78
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/ccss/2009/ccss200910presse.pdf (p. 4). 
79
  See the Report on Implementation of the French National Reform Programme, p. 77. 
80
  http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/ccss/2009/ccss200910presse.pdf (p. 3). 
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approximately mid of March, the value of FRR’s assets has gone up, with positive results 
during the second (+10,5% compared to -6,5% during the first quarter) and the third quarter 
(+9,2%) of 200981. As a result, the long-term annual performance (beginning in 2004) is again 
positive (+2,6%). 
                                  
81
  http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/IMG/pdf/Actifs_performances_au_30_septembre_2009.pdf. 
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4 Abstracts of Relevant Publications on Social Protection 
 
[R] Pensions 
[R1] General trends: demographic and financial forecasts 
[R2] General organisation: pillars, financing, calculation methods or pension formula 
[R3] Retirement age: legal age, early retirement, etc. 
[R4] Older workers activity: active measures on labour market, unemployment benefit policies, etc.  
[R5] Income and income conditions for senior workers and retired people: level of pensions, 
accumulation of pensions with earnings from work, etc.  
 
[H] Health 
[H1] Health expenditures: financing, macroeconomic impact, forecasting, etc. 
[H2] Public health policies, anti-addiction measures, prevention, etc. 
[H3] Health inequalities and access to health care: public insurance coverage, spatial  
inequalities, etc. 
[H4] Governance of the health system: institutional reforms, transfer to local authorities, etc. 
[H5] Management of the health system: HMO, payments system (capitation, reimbursement, etc.) 
[H6] Regulation of the pharmaceutical market 
[H7] Handicap 
 
[L] Long-term care 
 
 
[R1] CONSEIL D’ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES (COR), « Retraites : Perspectives 
actualisées à moyen et long terme en vue du rendez-vous de 2010, Huitième rapport », Paris : 
COR, April 2010, 98 p. http://www.cor-retraites.fr/article368.html 
“Pensions: Update of mid-term and long-term projections for the 2010 pension negotiation” 
This report presents COR’s most recent financial projections for the French pension 
system. The report has been specially prepared to serve as a basis for the 2010 
negotiation on a reform of statutory schemes. The first part presents the assumptions of 
the projections. In the “A” scenario, the long-term unemployment rate reaches 4,5% 
and productivity growth rate is set at 1,8%. In the “B” scenario, unemployment rates 
also reach 4,5%, but labour’s productivity growth rate is set at 1,5%. Finally, in the 
“C” scenario, the long-term unemployment rate is set at 7% and the trend for labour’s 
productivity growth is set at 1,5%. These three scenarios have been chosen to illustrate 
the uncertainties that currently exist on the long-term perspectives of the economy after 
the crisis. The second part presents the results of the projections which are run both for 
the mid run and the long run. The third and final part presents the conditions under 
which the financial equilibrium of the system can be reached in the mid run and in the 
long run. 
 
[R1; R2] CONSEIL D’ORIENTATION DES RETRAITES (COR), « Retraites : annuités, 
points ou comptes notionnels ? Options et modalités techniques - Septième rapport ». Paris : 
COR, January 2010, 261 p. http://www.cor-retraites.fr/IMG/pdf/doc-1276.pdf 
“Pensions: Annuities, points or notional accounts? Technical options and details - Seventh 
report” 
This is a report that has been prepared by the COR to assess the feasibility of the 
introduction of notional accounts in the French pension system. The main conclusion of 
the report is that such a move is feasible from a technical and a legal point of view, but 
that such a transition would need widespread political support to be implemented. The 
first part of the report outlines the main features of the current pension system. The 
French pension system is characterised by a multiplicity of schemes, the importance of 
redistribution, but also by a trend towards a convergence of rules within the different 
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schemes. The second part analyses the major options for a new retirement system: the 
different methods of calculating pensions (annuities – i.e. DB, points, notional 
accounts) are presented and this part provides an assessment of the consequences of the 
different benefit formulas for the running/governance of the pension system. The third 
part examines the technical details of a move to a point system or to a notional accounts 
system. This part starts with shedding light on the challenges that can arise during the 
transition and with a presentation of the different options for a transition (immediate or 
gradual transition). The report also studies the ways in which mechanisms of solidarity 
can be introduced in point systems and in notional defined contribution systems. 
Finally, the report assesses the feasibility of a reform from a legal and a technical point 
of view and evaluates the effects of the choice of different parameters in the new system, 
via the presentation of simulations carried out by the CNAV (National Old-Age 
Insurance Institution), INSEE (National Institute of Statistics) and the general 
secretariat of COR.  
 
[R1; R3; R4; R5] NORTIER Frédérique, ESNAULT Christelle. « La Retraite en France : 
statistiques, définitions, tendances, projections ». In : Observatoire des retraites – Les chiffres 
de la retraite, Dossier spécial, n°5, June 2009, 120 p. 
http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/uploads/tx_orpublications/LORC5.pdf  
“Pensions in France: statistics, definitions, trends, projections” 
This special issue provides a synthesis of the main statistics that are available about the 
French pension system. It includes accounting tables of the different pension schemes, a 
presentation of demographic ratios, of financial equilibria and projections of 
mandatory schemes and of the “Fonds de Réserve des Retraites” (state-run buffer 
fund). The paper also includes data about the situation of the active population (rates of 
activity, evolution of wages, etc.), about retirement behaviour (employment rates of 
workers aged 50-64, early retirement, long careers, “cumul emploi retraite”) and about 
the situation of pensioners (number of pensioners in different schemes, benefit levels, 
living standards of pensioners, poverty rate). A chapter is also devoted to right of 
information issue.  
 
[R2; R3; R4; R5] STERDYNIAK Henry, « Retraites: À la recherche de solutions 
miracles… », Revue de l’OFCE, 2009/2, 109, April 2009. 
“Old-age pensions: In search of miracle solutions…” 
This is an article that discusses current development in the French pension system and 
adopts a critical stance towards the reform proposals that have been put forward in 
2008 and 2009. On the one hand, the author discusses Bozio’s and Piketty’s suggestion 
to introduce a unified system of individual notional accounts. The author shows that, 
even though the system would be automatically in balance, this would be at the cost of a 
dramatic fall in pensions’ levels, which would widen as people live longer. On the other 
hand, the author discusses Hairault et al.’s suggestion (see below) to postpone the 
retirement age by introducing substantial financial incentives. While both proposals 
claim that they increase the free choice of retirement age and ensure actuarial 
neutrality, the author argues that they do not account for differences in 60 year-old 
workers’ employability and life expectancy. By basing pensions’ levels on individual 
choices, the proposals would free society and firms of their current responsibilities: 
ensuring a parity in the living standards of pensioners and workers as well as ensuring 
a decent pension to all workers, including those firms which do not want to hire 
anymore. 
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[R2; R5] BOZIO Antoine and PIKETTY Thomas, « Pour un nouveau système de retraite. 
Des comptes individuels de cotisations financés par répartition », Paris, Editions Rue 
d’Ulm/Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, 2008. 
“For a new pension system. Individual contribution accounts financed on pay-as-you-go 
basis” 
In this book, two French economists put forward a strategy for a thorough reform of the 
French pension system. The two authors start with the diagnosis that the French system 
is too fragmented and too difficult to understand for the majority of French citizens. 
Moreover, it faces difficulties in its long-term financing. As a result, the system arouses 
a feeling of fear and insecurity among citizens, while the initial aim of pay-as-you-go 
systems is to offer guarantees that funded schemes cannot offer. The authors propose to 
replace all existing schemes by a single NDC (notional defined-contribution) scheme 
for all workers (public sector, private sector and non-wage-earners). The authors claim 
that such a system would among other things: a) improve the transparency of the 
French pension system; b) be better adapted to an increasing occupational mobility; c) 
offer better benefits to households with long employment careers. In order to support 
their claims, the authors make simulations of replacement rates for various profiles of 
workers (with low or high wages and with long careers). 
 
[R2; R5] LECLERC Dominique, « Avis sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2010 au nom de 
la commission des affaires sociales : régimes sociaux et de retraite ». Paris : Sénat (Rapport, 
103), 2009, 47 p. http://www.senat.fr/rap/a09-103-3/a09-103-31.pdf 
“Opinion on the draft budget law for 2010 on behalf of the Committee on Social Affairs: 
pension and benefit systems” 
This report which has been produced by the French Senate assesses the financial effects 
of the reform of the “régimes spéciaux de retraite” (special pension schemes which 
cover employees in state-owned firms). Even if the Government set the main guidelines 
of the reform, the negotiation on the concrete measures was decentralised and 
conducted within each firm. According to preliminary estimates made known to the 
rapporteur of the Committee, it appears that the cost of the concessions granted to 
employees of the SNCF (National Railway Company) and RATP (Paris Public 
Transport Network) will be almost equivalent to the expected savings from the reform. 
The Senate’s Committee of Social Affairs highlights the fact that this may confirm its 
feat that the gains from the reform of the special pension schemes could ultimately be 
much lower for the community than the initial estimates which were too optimistic. 
 
[R3; R4] D'AUTUME Antoine, « Les Seniors et l'emploi en France ». In : DARES - Travail 
et Emploi, n°118, April-June 2009, 5 p.  
“Elderly workers and employment in France” 
Based on statistical data, this study takes stock of the situation of elderly workers in 
France. France, which is increasingly aware of the low employment rate of workers 
aged 55-64, has been establishing incentives for individuals to extend their working 
lives, since the 2003 Fillon pension reform. Yet it fails to improve this rate, while other 
European countries have achieved striking success. The article discusses three possible 
explanations for the low employment rate of older workers: lower productivity, high 
wages and early retirement.  
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[R3; R4] BENALLAH Samia, LEGENDRE François, « Les "Décotants" du régime général 
en 2005 : qui sont-ils ? » In: CNAV - Retraite et société, n°57, June 2009, 20 p.  
“Workers retiring with a “pension penalty” in the regime general in 2005: who are they?” 
The reasons for retiring with a “decote” (i.e. pension penalty for workers retiring 
before having reached the required length of contribution to get a full pension) are 
quite different for women and for men. The pension penalty affects primarily women 
who are out of the labor market, because they are less skilled, less healthy and often 
unemployed. Women’s probability of retiring with a pension penalty increases with the 
reference wage. Men who retire with a pension penalty generally are situated in the 
median in the distribution of skills and in the distribution of wages. They are more often 
unemployed or in ill health. 
 
[R3; R4] BENALLAH Samia, METTE Corinne, “Âge moyen de départ en retraite : 
tendances récentes et évolutions attendues”. CNAV - Retraite et société, n°58, November 
2009, 18 p.  
“Average age of retirement: recent trends and expected developments” 
Using statistical data, this paper describes the evolution of the age at which people start 
to take their pension from the “régime général” (private-sector wage-earners’ scheme 
which covers 60% of the population). The average age of the insured in the “régime 
général” at the time of retirement has changed significantly over the last fifteen years. 
On average, the insured started taking their pension at age 61 in 2007 compared to age 
62 in 2001. In 2007, just as in 2001, women retired on average at age 61.5, i.e. one year 
after men (60.5 years on average). Measures like the early retirement scheme for 
workers with a long career have contributed to lower the average age of retirement. 
Improved financial incentives for postponed retirement (such as the “surcote” – 
pension bonus) should contribute to increasing the average age of retirement. This 
article concludes with an analysis of the barriers to raising the statutory age of 
retirement and analyses the many parameters on which the evolution of the statutory 
retirement age depends. 
 
[R3; R4] HAIRAULT Jean-Olivier, LANGOT François and SOPRASEUTH Thepthida, « Le 
faible taux d’emploi des seniors. Distance à l’entrée dans la vie active ou distance à la 
retraite? », In : Revue de l’OFCE, 2009/2, 109, April 2009. 
“The low employment rates among the elderly. Distance from entry to the labour market or 
distance to retirement?” 
In a recent work (Hairault et al., 2006), the authors of this article have claimed that the 
short distance to retirement constitutes one of the main economic mechanisms behind 
the low employment rate of older workers. As a result, they argued that delaying the 
retirement age could boost employment at the end of the working life. Their view has 
been challenged by Benallah et al. (2008) who underline that the distance to retirement 
found in their previous work could actually reflect the distance from entry to the labour 
market (experience effect). In this paper, the authors propose what they see as more 
convincing identification strategies in order to strengthen their previous results. The 
paper proposes econometric estimations of different factors affecting early retirement, 
based on a sample of men aged between 15 and 59 from the “Enquête Emploi” (French 
labour market survey) from the years 1990-2002. 
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[R5] BONTOUT Olivier, BRUN Amandine, RAPOPORT Benoît, « Les Droits à la retraite 
des jeunes générations ». In : DREES - Dossiers solidarité et santé, n°10, 2009, 45 p. 
http://www.sante.gouv.fr/drees/dossier-solsa/pdf/article200910.pdf 
“Pension entitlements of young generations” 
In this study, the DREES (research department of the Ministry of Health) analyses 
trends in the evolution of the age of education completion and in the activity rates and 
durations of employment of workers aged 30. Based mostly on INSEE (National 
Institute of Statistics) data, the study offers a comparison between different cohorts. The 
age of education completion and the age at which youths actually enter the labour 
market are key moments for the accumulation of pension rights. The DREES observes a 
decrease in the length of contribution of workers aged 30. The average contribution 
length of workers born in 1970 and aged 30 is lower by 7 trimesters than that of the 
cohort born in 1950. Since the seventies, increasing difficulties in the integration of 
young people into the labour market have led to a sharp decline in the average period 
of employment before age 30. When the generation born in 1934-1943 and that born in 
1964-1973 are compared, the drop in the length of contribution is about 2.6 years 
(three years for men, with a drop from 12 to 9 years and 2.3 years for women, with a 
drop to 7.1 years from 9.4 years). 
 
[H] Health 
 
[H1] HAUT CONSEIL POUR L’AVENIR DE L’ASSURANCE MALADIE (H.C.A.A.M.). 
« Rapport du Haut Conseil pour l’avenir de l’assurance maladie 2009 ». Paris : HCAAM : 
2009/09 : 163 p., tabl., ann., 
http://www.securite-sociale.fr/institutions/hcaam/rapport2009/hcaam_rapport2009.pdf. 
“Report of the High Council on the Future of Health Insurance 2009” 
In its 2009 report, the Haut Conseil pour l’Avenir de l’Assurance Maladie assesses the 
accounts of health insurances, analyse the role played by various financiers (public and 
private ones) in the system, analyses medical control and devotes important analysis to 
overbilling (“dépassement d’honoraires”). 
 
[H3] CHADELAT Jean.-François, TABUTEAU Didier (eds) « Les dix ans de la CMU (1999-
2009) ». Actes du colloque Fonds CMU – Chaire Santé. 2009/09/08 Paris : Editions santé ; 
Paris : Les Presses SciencesPo : 2009 : 76p., 
http://www.editionsdesante.fr/services/livres/edocs/00/00/11/A2/document_ouvrage.phtml. 
“Ten Years of Universal Sickness Scheme (1999-2009)” 
The Act of 27 July 27 1999 created the CMU, achieving the goal of universal health 
insurance. But the reform had another ambition: to allow free access of populations 
most disadvantaged to the health system. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Act, the CMU Fund and Chair of Health at Sciences Po, in partnership with Médecins 
du Monde, coorganised a conference to draw a review of this major reform. The 
proceedings of this conference trace the genesis of the CMU and consider the place of 
this new device within the whole social protection system. It also analyses the limits and 
shortcomings of this new measure, including difficulties for foreigners, and the denials 
of care to beneficiaries benefiting from the supplementary CMU.  
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[H3] HADA François., RICARDO Christophe., TOURAINE Marisol.,« Les inégalités face à 
la santé ». Paris : Fondation Jean Jaurès : 2009 : 71p. 
“Inequalities in health” 
The progress in improving the health status does not benefit all: France, more than its 
European neighbours, suffers from increasing inequalities - especially of social nature - 
in health. However, far more than the question of balancing the budget, health is a 
mirror of our society. At a time when the Government imposes decisive choices in this 
area, the Jean-Jaurès Foundation and the Socialist Group of the National Assembly 
initiated a joint reflection on these inequalities in health.  
 
[H4; H5] CLEMENT Jean-Marie, La nouvelle loi Hôpital patients santé et territoires : 
analyse critique et perspectives. Bordeaux, Les Études Hospitalières, 2009, 131 p. 
http://www.leh.fr/edition/page005003483.html  
“The new law on Hospital. Patients, Health and Territories: analysis, critical view and 
perspectives” 
The new law No 2009-879 of 21 July 2009 on the reform of the hospital and on patient 
health and territories, (known as the HPST), goes far beyond the hospital sector, it 
concerns the whole field of health care and medico-social care. This book synthesises 
the main elements of the law. From prevention to chronic care, all facets of health care 
delivery are concerned. The changing role of the state is emphasised, as wella sits 
consequences for health professionals and all health care providers. The State, through 
its decentralised regional authorities, grouped into regional health agencies, will 
therefore be more able to impose its policies to the overall health and medico-social 
care.  
 
[H4; H5] COUTY Edouard, KOUCHNER Camille, LAUDIER Anne, TABUTEAU Didier, 
« La Loi HPST, Regards sur la réforme du système de santé ». Presses de l’EHESP, 2010, 
400p. 
“The law on Hospital, Patients, Health and Territories (HPST). An eye on the reform of the 
health system” 
The law of 21 July 2009 on the reform of the hospital and on patient health and 
territories (known as HPST) is expected to drastically modify the French health system. 
The four titles of the Act (Upgrading of health facilities, Access for all to quality care, 
Prevention and public health and Territorial organisation of the health system) are the 
subject of comments written under the direction of the book editors. Each review traces 
the evolution of key provisions under the previous legislation and parliamentary 
debates, and comes ahead of changes in the health system. These comments are 
themselves extended through the eyes of people who, like Claude Evin, Miche. 
Legmann, Jean-Marie Bertrand and many other leading experts on health, display their 
personal thoughts on the subject. 
 
[L] Long-term care 
 
[L] LE BIHAN-YOUINOU, Blanche, « La prise en charge des personnes âgées dépendantes 
en France. Vers la création d’un cinquième risque ? », in : Informations sociales, 1/2010 
(n°157), p.124-133. 
“Long term care for the dependant elderly in France. Towards the creation of a fifth risk?” 
This article provides a brief overview of the history of elderly care policy in France, 
and presents the orientations that are presently put forward for the development of a’ 
fifth risk’ based on the social insurance model. It shows that the aim of the potential 
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reform is not to create a real social insurance scheme but rather to develop new 
complementarities between a public scheme that will remain insufficient to cover the 
needs of the dependant elderly and private schemes to lessen the burden on relatives. 
 
[L] BRANCHU Christine, VOISIN Joëlle, GUEDJ Jérôme, LACAZE Didier, PAUL 
Stéphane. « Etat des lieux relatif à la composition des coûts mis à la charge des résidents des 
établissements d'hébergement pour personnes âgées dépendantes (EHPAD) ». Inspection 
Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS), 01/10/2009, 144 p. 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/094000473/index.shtml 
“A status report on the composition of the out-of-pocket costs charged to residents of 
residential homes for frail elderly” 
This report, which offers a survey of the costs met by the dependant elderly or their 
relatives in case of residential care, is the result of an inquiry set up by the General 
Inspectorate for Social Affairs (IGAS) as part of the work programme that was adopted 
for 2009. The first chapter provides an account of all the information collected during 
the visits that were carried out in the four ‘départements’ under study, covering 17 
residential homes for dependant elderly people (EHPAD) and 3 long-term care units 
(USLD). Based on this information, chapter 2 identifies some of the main issues, namely 
the level of the out-of-pocket costs for the resident, and the link between the costs and 
the content of the service (or more specifically the lack of transparency and absence of 
link between costs and quality). The last chapter offers some elements of response to 
two questions that are likely, according to IGAS, to become key issues for the future: 
Which tools could be used to reduce the out-of-pocket costs for the residents and their 
relatives? Can the price of a stay in a residential home for dependant elderly people 
evolve under pressure of a different ratio between supply and demand? The report 
shows that in fact there is a growing inadequacy on the supply side (with the 
construction, especially in urban areas, of more luxurious and expensive residences 
with prohibitive tariffs) and all indicators point towards a further increase in costs for 
the elderly. 
 
[L] DEBOUT, Clotilde, LO, Seak-Hy, « L’allocation personnalisée d’autonomie et la 
prestation de compensation du handicap au 30 juin 2009 », In: DREES - Études et Résultats, 
n°710, November 2009, 6 p. http://www.sante-sports.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/er710-4.pdf 
“The personalised autonomy benefit and the disability compensation benefit on 30 June 
2009“. 
This short publication provides a statistical overview of the autonomy (APA) and 
disability (PCH and ACTP) benefits on 30 June 2009: number of recipients, benefit 
levels, break-down between institutional and domiciliary care and between the different 
types of benefits, evolution over the past few years…It shows that the increase in the 
number of APA recipients has been less than in past years (only +2,1% instead of 
+4,4% in previous years), while there has been a very sharp increase (+67%) in the 
number of recipients of the PCH disability benefit between 2008 and 2009. 
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[L] FOUQUET Annie, LAROQUE Michel, PUYDEBOIS Cédric, « La gestion de l'allocation 
personnalisée d'autonomie. Synthèse des contrôles de la mise en oeuvre de l'APA réalisés 
dans plusieurs départements », Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS), 
02/10/2009, 108 p. 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/094000474/index.shtml 
“The management of the personalised autonomy benefit. A synthesis of the controls carried 
out in several départements regarding the implementation of the personalised autonomy 
benefit”.  
The personalised Autonomy Benefit (APA) came into force on 1st of January 2002 to 
provide financial support to the dependant elderly to meet their care needs. This report, 
which is part of IGAS’ 2009 annual work programme, presents the results of control 
audits carried out in 4 ‘départements’. It develops an analysis and formulates 
recommendations along six themes: transversal elements of analysis; organisation of 
the instruction and decision process; medico-social evaluation; financial management; 
pricing of home help services and institutional care; steering, information systems and 
dissemination of good practice. It makes recommendations regarding the modification 
of legislative texts and of good practice, and calls for a strengthening of the role of the 
CNSA (National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy).  
 
[L] ROUSSILLE Bernadette, STROHL Hélène, RAYMOND Michel, « Enquête sur les 
conditions de la qualité des services d'aide à domicile pour les personnes âgées ». Inspection 
Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS), 02/10/2009, 145 p. 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/094000475/index.shtml 
“An investigation of the quality in home-help services for the elderly”. 
This report deals with the issue of the quality in the field of - non medical - home help 
services for elderly people (cleaning, help with daily activities, etc). The authors of this 
report discuss the different legislative rules and regulations and the application of 
European directives in the field if services, as well as the quantitative development of 
jobs in this field. They highlight the difficulty in controlling and evaluating the quality 
(controls and audits based on desk audits, never on interviews with the recipients; 
limited power of the Conseil Général over the providers despite being in charge of the 
personalised autonomy benefit (APA); employment based on private (person to person) 
contracts; implication of numerous state services without any real coordination…). The 
report sets forward a number of proposals destined to simplify the national rules and 
norms while reinforcing control on the implementation of these regulations to reduce 
the risks of non-quality, and to improve quality. 
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5 List of Important Institutions 
 
Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés – National Health 
Insurance Fund for the Salaried Workers 
Address: 50 avenue du Professeur André Lemierre, 75986 Paris Cedex 20 
Webpage: http://www.ameli.fr/l-assurance-maladie/statistiques-et-
publications/ 
The National Health Insurance Fund for the Salaried Workers is the main health insurance 
funds, providing health care coverage to 80% of the French population. CNMATS has one 
research unit, in charge of statistics and research. It regularly publishes "Points de repères" 
which gather statistical data on health in France, and a journal: “Pratiques et organisation 
des soins”. 
 
Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse (CNAV) 
Address: 110 avenue de Flandre, 75951 Paris cedex 19 
Webpage: http://www.cnav.fr 
CNAV is the social protection administration that manages private-sector wage-earners 
pension scheme. CNAV has different research units. One unit compiles and analyses 
statistical data. Another unit specialises in research over ageing. Main publications include: 
“Retraite et Société”, “Cadr@ge”, “Les Cahiers de la CNAV”. 
 
Caisse Nationale de Solidarité pour l’Autonomie (CNSA) – National Solidarity Fund for 
Autonomy 
Address: 66 avenue du Maine, 75682 Paris cedex 14 
Phone: 33 (0)1 53 91 28 00 
Webpage: http://www.cnsa.fr/ 
The CNSA is a public agency that was set up in 2005. It is both a “fund” in charge of 
distributing financial resources, and an “agency” providing technical expertise. Its mission is 
to finance the social benefits geared towards the dependent elderly and the disabled; to 
guarantee equal treatment across the country and for all types of disabilities; and to provide 
technical expertise, information and guidance in order to survey the quality of services.  
Main recurring publications: 
The Annual Report (le Rapport Annuel): This report presents all the actions that have been 
carried out during the year and takes stocks of what has been achieved since the creation of 
the CNSA. It also addresses future orientations.  
The Letter (La Lettre): The Letter is published on a quarterly basis and provides information 
on ongoing activities and projects, publishes interviews of people involved in the field, etc. 
 
Commission des comptes de la Sécurité sociale (CCSS) – Commission on Social Security 
Accounts. 
Webpage: http://www.securite-sociale.fr/chiffres/ccss/ccss.htm 
This institution is not an administration with specific staff working for it, and has therefore no 
specific mail address. Created in 1979, the Commission on social security accounts has the 
role of analysing the accounts of the social security funds. It also looks at the accounts of the 
complementary pensions. The Commission is chaired by the minister in charge of the social 
security. It meets at least twice a year, on the initiative of its president: the first meeting is 
held between on April 15th and on June 15th and a first estimate of the accounts of the 
general scheme of social security is published; the second meeting proceeds between on 
September 15th and on October 15th. The accounts of the whole of the mandatory schemes of 
social security are presented and analysed by the Commission. Since the adoption of the 
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financing law of social security, the second meeting is held around on September 20th. It is 
devoted to the examination of the accounts which are used as framework for the financing law 
of social security. 
 
Cour des Comptes – Financial Auditing Court  
Address: 13 rue Cambon, 75001 Paris 
Webpage: http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/Accueil.html 
The missions of the Cour des comptes are defined by the Constitution in paragraph 1 of 
article 47-2:"The Cour des comptes shall assist Parliament in monitoring Government action. 
It shall assist Parliament and the Government in monitoring the implementation of Finances 
Acts and of Social Security Financing Acts as well as in assessing public policies. By means 
of its public reports, it shall contribute to informing citizens. […]"As an administrative 
jurisdiction, the Cour des comptes fulfils these missions in full independence. The Cour 
monitors that Ministers respect the budget appropriations voted by both assemblies. It checks 
results in terms of expenditures as well as receipts. It contributes to the accurate awareness of 
the State's financial situation. It proceeds in a similar way for the whole social security 
system that complies with organisational rules and budgetary principles that are far different 
from those of the State”.Every year, the Cour releases a report on the implementation of the 
Social security financing Act. 
 
Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques (DREES) 
Address: Mission publications et diffusion, 14 avenue Duquesne, 75350 
Paris 07 SP 
Phone: 0033.1.40.56.80.54 
E-mail: drees-infos@sant.gouv.fr 
Webpage: http://www.sante-sports.gouv.fr/etudes-recherches-
statistiques/etudes-recherches-statistiques-sante/direction-
recherche-etudes-evaluation-statistiques-2-.html 
DREES is the research unit of the Ministry of Health, but it publishes reports on social 
protection issues in general. Main publications include: “Études et resultats”, “Revue 
française des affaires sociales”, “Dossiers Solidarité et Santé” and working papers. 
 
Haute Autorité de Santé – French National Authority for Health 
Address: 2, avenue du Stade de France, 93218 Saint-Denis La Plaine 
Cedex 
Phone: 00 33 1 55 93 70 00 
Webpage: http://www.has-sante.fr/ 
The Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) - or French National Authority for Health - was set up by 
the French Government in August 2004 in order to bring together under a single roof a 
number of activities designed to improve the quality of patient care and to guarantee equity 
within the health care system. HAS activities are diverse. They range from assessment of 
drugs, medical devices, and procedures to publication of guidelines to accreditation of health 
care organisations and certification of doctors. All are based on rigorously acquired 
scientific expertise. Training in quality issues and information provision are also key 
components of its work programme. HAS publishes various reports. 
 
Haut Conseil sur l'Avenir de l'Assurance Maladie – High Council for the future of Health 
insurance 
Address: Ministère de la santé, de la jeunesse, des sports et de la vie 
associative, 18 place des Cinq Martyrs du Lycée Buffon, 75696 
Paris Cedex 14 
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Webpage: http://www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/dossiers/hcaam/sommaire.htm 
The High council, chaired by Bertrand Fragonard, brings together 58 members representing 
the unions and employers, the Parliament, the State, the health insurance funds, the mutual 
insurance companies, the professions and health care institutions, the users, as well as 
qualified personalities. The High council for the future of the health insurance has four 
missions: to assess the system of health insurance and its evolutions; to describe the financial 
situation and the prospects for the health insurance and to appreciate the requirements to 
ensure their viability in the long term; to take care of the cohesion of the system of health 
insurance regarding the equal access to care of high-quality and a just and equitable 
financing, to formulate, if necessary, the recommendations or reform proposals likely to 
answer the objectives of financial solidity and social cohesion. HACCM publishes an annual 
report and specific positions (avis). 
 
Institut de Recherches èÉconomiques et Sociales (IRES) – Institute of Economic and 
Social Research 
Address: 16 Boulevard du Mont d’Est, 93192 Noisy-le-Grand cedex 
Phone: 0033 1 48 15 18 90 
Webpage: http://www.ires.fr/  
IRES is a research institute whose aim is to provide studies on social and economic issues for 
trade unions. On the one hand, it prepares studies agreed upon by all trade unions. Its 
scientific programme is defined every four years. On the other hand, it prepares studies 
commissioned by individual trade unions. The institute employs approximately 30 
researchers. Main publications include: “La Revue de l’IRES”, “La Chronique 
Internationale de l’IRES”, “La lettre de l’IRES” and working papers. 
 
Institut de Recherche et Documentation en Économie de la Santé (IRDES) – Institute for 
Research and Information in Health Economics 
Address: 10 rue Vauvenargues, 75018 Paris 
Phone: 00 33 1 53 93 43 00 
Webpage: http://www.irdes.fr/ 
IRDES's primary mission is to provide high quality research and information for those who 
are interested in the future of health care systems. IRDES's multidisciplinary team monitors 
and analyses trends in the behaviour of consumers and health care professionals from a 
medical, economic, geographic and sociological perspective. In addition, IRDES provides 
access to health information for general public through its documentation centre. 
IRDES develops and conducts periodic and targeted surveys on populations, health care 
professionals, and institutions, to collect data on medical care production and consumption. 
Partnership agreements also enable it to make use of surveys conducted by other 
organisations (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, sickness funds, IMS 
France.) IRDES publishes various working papers. 
 
Ministère du Travail, des Relations sociales, de la Famille, de la Solidarité et de la Ville –
Ministry of Labour, Social Relations, Family and Solidarity 
Address: 127, rue de Grenelle, 75007 PARIS 07 SP, France 
Webpage: http://www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/ 
 
Ministère de la Santé et des Sports – Ministry of Health and Sports 
Address: 14, avenue Duquesne, 75350 PARIS 07 SP, France 
Phone: + 33 (0) 825 302 302 
Webpage: http://www.sante-jeunesse-sports.gouv.fr/ 
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L'Observatoire des Retraites – Pensions Observatory 
Address: 16-18 rue Jules César, 75012 Paris 
Phone: 0033 1 71 72 12 00 
Webpage: http://www.observatoire-retraites.org/  
The Observatoire des Retraites has been created in 1991 by AGIRC and ARRCO schemes. Its 
main objectives are to:  
- promote studies and analyses of the French pension system and of foreign pension 
systems 
- improve access to reliable and non-partisan information on pension systems. 
The main publication of the Observatoire des Retraites is the “Lettre de l’Observatoire des 
Retraites” which is published several times every year. 
 
Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques (OFCE) – The French Economic 
Observatory 
Address: 69 quai d'Orsay, 75340 Paris cedex 07 
Phone: 0033 1 44 18 54 00 
Webpage: http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr 
The OFCE is both a university research centre and an institution for forecasting and 
evaluating public policies. It brings together over 40 French and international researchers, 
including several internationally renowned research fellows and three Nobel Prize laureates. 
The OFCE is organised into four departments – Analysis & Forecasting, Research, 
Innovation & Competition, and Globalisation. The OFCE publishes both a quarterly review 
(“Revue de l’OFCE”) and a monthly newsletter (“Lettre de l’OFCE”) with in-depth analyses 
of pertinent subjects and issues of debate, as well as working papers. The Observatory also 
publishes annually several documents that bring together contributions from its specialists: 
L’Économie française, L’état de l’Union européenne, and the Report on the State of the 
European Union. 
 
Secrétariat général du Conseil d'orientation des retraites Conseil d’Orientation des 
Retraites (COR) – Pension Orientation Council 
Address: 113, rue de Grenelle, 75007 Paris 
Phone: 0033 1 42 75 65 50 
Webpage: http://www.cor-retraites.fr/index.php 
The COR is a structure created by the Jospin Government in 2000 that gathers 
representatives of the main stakeholders in the pension system (trade unions, employers’ 
associations, pensioners’ organisations, family associations, MPs, civil servants, directors of 
public pension administrations as well as experts). COR regularly feeds the pension debate by 
publishing reports and documents that are considered as highly reliable and serve as a basis 
for the preparation of pension reforms. All COR documents are publicly available on the 
internet. 
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This publication is financed by the European Community Programme for Employment and 
Social Solidarity (2007-2013). This programme was established to support the 
implementation of the objectives of the European Union in the employment and social affairs 
area, as set out in the Social Agenda, and thereby contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon 
Strategy goals in these fields. The seven-year Programme targets all stakeholders who can 
help shape the development of appropriate and effective employment and social legislation 
and policies, across the EU-27, EFTA and EU candidate and pre-candidate countries. The 
Programme has six general objectives. These are: 
 
(1) to improve the knowledge and understanding of the situation prevailing in the Member 
States (and in other participating countries) through analysis, evaluation and close monitoring 
of policies; 
(2) to support the development of statistical tools and methods and common indicators, where 
appropriate broken down by gender and age group, in the areas covered by the programme; 
(3) to support and monitor the implementation of Community law, where applicable, and 
policy objectives in the Member States, and assess their effectiveness and impact; 
(4) to promote networking, mutual learning, identification and dissemination of good practice 
and innovative approaches at EU level; 
(5) to enhance the awareness of the stakeholders and the general public about the EU policies 
and objectives pursued under each of the policy sections; 
(6) to boost the capacity of key EU networks to promote, support and further develop EU 
policies and objectives, where applicable. 
 
For more information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=327&langId=en  
 
